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ABSTRACT
As China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown, its approach to inter-
national investment agreements (IIAs) has changed. China is now one of the world’s
most important outward investors, with Chinese FDI facing widespread criticism. The
challenge for China is to adapt to this new configuration of interests stemming from
these developments, both in terms of its national policies and the contents of its IIAs.
In so doing, it is likely to influence, perhaps significantly, the further evolution of inter-
national investment law. This article deals briefly with the salient features of China’s
outward FDI and the policies that support it (Section A); the perception and reception
of China’s outward FDI in key host countries (Section B); and the changing nature of
the country’s approach to international investment treaties (Section C). The article
concludes (Section D) with a brief review and outlook.
I . SALIENT FEATURES OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI AND POLICY
ISSUES RELATED TO THEM
A. The rise of China’s outward FDI
China has become a major player in the world FDI market. The country’s
outward FDI flows grew from US$7 billion in 20011 to US$101 billion in
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20132 and US$116 billion in 2014,3 for an accumulated stock of US$730 billion.4 In
terms of outflows, this made China the single most important home country among
all emerging markets5 in 2014, and the third (behind the USA and Hong Kong
(China)) largest among all home countries,6 complementing its role as the single
largest host country among developing countries. Indications are that China’s out-
ward FDI will continue to rise, with one source projecting US$1-2 trillion in global
Chinese outward FDI from 2010–20.7 In fact, China’s outward FDI flows have al-
ready almost caught up with China’s inward FDI flows: in 2001, outward FDI flows
as a percentage of inward FDI flows were 15%;8 in 2014, they were 90%.9 China
may soon be a net outward FDI flows country.
China’s 16,000 multinational enterprises (MNEs) had established some 22,000
foreign affiliates in 179 countries and territories by end-2012.10 Mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) have become an important entry mode into foreign markets. It is,
however, difficult to ascertain how the country’s FDI is distributed across sectors and
geographic regions, as more than two-thirds of China’s non-financial sector outflows
are channelled via financial centers and tax havens (Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands,
the British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, Panama);11 consequently it is not known in
which countries and sectors they are ultimately invested. But it seems to be likely
that services and natural resources are the most important sectors, and that Chinese
firms have invested substantially in both developed and developing countries.
These figures should not disguise, however, that, globally, China’s average share
in world FDI outflows averaged only 5% during 2010–12, while its share in the
world’s outward FDI stock was 3% in 2014.12
A mix of motives drives the growth of China’s outward FDI, motives also known
from the growth of MNEs headquartered in other countries, although their relative
importance may vary.13 A good part is resource–seeking, explained by the fact that
China is short of mineral and petroleum resources, while its rapid economic growth
needs these in high quantities. Trade-supporting FDI is important, reflecting the
country’s leading role in international exports. Also relevant is the desire to access
2 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs. An Action Plan 206 (Geneva:
UNCTAD, 2014), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.
3 See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance (Geneva:
UNCTAD, 2015) A4.
4 See ibid. at A8.
5 See ibid. Annex table 2.
6 See UNCTAD, above n 3, at 8.
7 See Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese Invests in Europe: Patterns, Impacts and Policy
Implications 5 (New York: Rhodium Group, 2012). This compares to a global FDI outward stock of US$
26 trillion in 2013; see UNCTAD, n 2, at 30.
8 See UNCTAD Stat, available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx.
9 See UNCTAD, n 3, at A4.
10 Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), Summary 2012 Statistical Bulletin of
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (10 August 2013), available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/art
icle/tongjiziliao/dgzz/201309/20130900295526.shtml.
11 MOFCOM, 2011 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, available at http://
images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/201309/20130923082710756.pdf.
12 UNCTAD, above n 3.
13 See, e.g., Peter J. Buckley et al., ‘The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment’, 38
Journal of International Business Studies 499 (2007).
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markets through direct investment (as opposed to trade), including to protect the
China’s exporters against possible trade barriers. A number of projects are further-
more characterized by the need to acquire technology and other asset-augmenting
resources (such as brand names and distribution networks). Given rising costs par-
ticularly in the country’s coastal provinces (especially of labor), efficiency-seeking in-
vestment is becoming important, directed mainly to some Asian and African
countries. Finally, a number of specific factors play a role, including round-tripping
funds back into the country (e.g., to benefit from the protection of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs)), to benefit from lower taxes (or avoid taxes), to park funds
abroad for future uses, or simply to take funds out of the country under the guise of
outward FDI.14
B. Principal characteristics
Apart from its rapid and speedy rise and the salient features already mentioned, there
are two other features that characterize China’s outward FDI.
The first one is that, in distinction to virtually all other major outward investors,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for a substantial share of the country’s out-
ward FDI flows and stock. In addition, many non-SOEs (especially the bigger ones)
are linked to China’s government in one way or another, including because top ex-
ecutives and board member are members of the Chinese Communist Party, some-
times in high positions.15 Although, as of the end of 2011, some 13,500 Chinese
financial and non-financial enterprises had established about 18,000 foreign affiliates
in 177 host economies,16 the 113 central SOEs controlled by the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)17 alone accounted for 66%
of China’s non-financial FDI outflows and 76% of the country’s non-financial out-
ward FDI stock in 2011.. This raises the question of whether China’s outward FDI
(or at least a good part of it) might be made for purposes other than commercial
ones and, more specifically, may be detrimental to the national security of host coun-
tries.18 The extent to which this might be the case in a systematic manner is difficult
to ascertain, as it is for the outward FDI of SOEs headquartered in other countries.19
14 This can also involve individuals who may buy real estate or otherwise take their funds abroad under the
guise of outward FDI.
15 See Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, ‘Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm’,
Georgetown Law Journal (forthcoming 2015). It is of course difficult to determine how much influence
this has on the day-to-day operations of a firm, as many of the founders and chief executives of that gener-
ation were members of the Party and/or government.
16 MOFCOM, above n 11, at 3.
17 See State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, available at
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html (last visited 17 July 2014).
18 For a discussion of these concerns, Karl P. Sauvant et al. (eds), Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy
Reactions (Oxford University Press, New York 2012).
19 In this context, it should be noted that outward FDI by SOEs headquartered in developed countries is
significantly more important than that by SOEs headquartered in emerging markets. More specifically, in
2010, of the top 100 largest non-financial MNEs worldwide and the 100 largest headquartered in emerg-
ing markets (determined on the basis of the size of their foreign assets), 49 were SOEs. Of these 49, 20
were headquartered in developed countries, controlling US$1.4 trillion in foreign assets, while 29 were
headquartered in emerging markets, controlling US$0.4 trillion. See Karl P. Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss,
‘State-controlled Entities Control Nearly US$2 Trillion in Foreign Assets’, 64 Column FDI
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Still, as will be discussed below, these concerns have led to the creation or
strengthening of regulatory review processes of incoming M&As in a number of
countries, especially for certain sensitive industries. The September 2012 veto by the
President of the USA of a Chinese windmill project near a military base in
Oregon—the first such veto in 22 years, and only the second one in the history of
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the USA—is emblematic of these con-
cerns.20 On the other hand, China’s government has encouraged private enterprises’
overseas investment in the past several years. For example, the National
Development and Reform Commission issued ‘The Implementation Opinions on
Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to Actively Conduct Overseas
Investment’ in 2012,21 which created preferential policies for the outward FDI of pri-
vate enterprises, including tax incentives, financial support, and custom reform.
The second feature that distinguishes China’s outward FDI concerns the fact that
China has a relatively sophisticated regulatory framework dealing with outward FDI.
It is a framework that has moved, within two decades, from restricting to encourag-
ing.22 Embedded in an overall development strategy, China’s ‘going out’ strategy23
has two principal purposes. One, the regulatory framework facilitates and supports
outward FDI to create globally competitive Chinese firms: a portfolio of locational
assets in form of an international network of foreign affiliates provides access to re-
sources of all kinds (including know-how, brand names) and facilitates access to mar-
kets; both enhance corporate competitiveness, including by allowing firms to
upgrade their own capabilities and thus compete more successfully in the domestic
market (with other domestic firms and foreign affiliates in China). Two, China’s out-
ward FDI framework encourages the type of outward FDI that contributes directly
to China’s development, especially by obtaining natural resources, promoting exports
or strengthening the country’s technological base.24 The government has put in place
an institutional structure and various instruments (‘home country measures’) for this
purpose.
Although a number of government institutions have, in one way or another, a say
on outward FDI, the principal ones are the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Together with
a number of other institutions, they established (in 2006) a ‘Sector direction policy’
that provides guidance for specific promotional measures on the basis of investment
that is encouraged, allowed and prohibited.25 The specific instruments used to
Perspectives(2012) 1. ‘SOEs’ are defined as enterprises in which the government has a controlling inter-
est, with ‘control’ defined as a stake of 10% or more of voting power. ibid at 2.
20 In rare move, ‘Obama Unwinds Chinese Acquisition of U.S. Wind Farms’, 12(39) Inside U.S. Trade 1,
(2012) at 16–17,
21 See National Development and Reform Commission, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/wzly/
zcfg/wzzcjwtz/201404/t20140410_606603.html (last visited 26 August 2014).
22 For a detailed discussion, see Karl P. Sauvant and Victor Z. Chen, ‘China’s Regulatory Framework for
Outward Foreign Direct Investment’, 7 China Economy Journal 141 (2013), at 141–163.
23 The ‘going out’ strategy, which guided the creation of the current FDI policy and regulatory framework,
was announced by the Third Plenum of the Ninth National People’s Congress in March 2000. See Xiao
Yu and Lei Jiao, ‘A Brief Introduction of the “go out” Strategy’, 2 Qiaowu Gongzuo Yanjiu 1 (2011),
available at http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/159/1743.shtml.
24 See Sauvant and Chen, above n 22.
25 See ibid.
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encourage outward FDI include various subsidies (including financial and fiscal sup-
port); priority access to loans; expedited approval; priority access to foreign ex-
change; tax rebates on (or waivers for) the export of goods (e.g., equipment);
priority regarding overseas financing, investment consulting, risk assessment, risk
control, and investment insurance; and priority treatment regarding information
questions, consular protection, customs exit and the entry of personnel, expatriate
personnel approval, registration and the domestic coordination of import–export op-
eration rights, and international communication.26 These home country measures
seem to be equally available to both SOEs and private enterprises, at least as far as
the formal regulatory framework is concerned.27 At the same time, China has a num-
ber of regulations in place that prescribe standards of behavior for its foreign
investors.28
Finally, a network of 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs),29 as well as a num-
ber of other international investment agreements, provides protection to China’s
outward investors. While these treaties were originally concluded with inward FDI in
mind, they have evolved considerably over time to reflect the rise of China as an out-
ward investor, an evolution discussed below in this paper.
C. Implications
Against this background, three observations are in order.
One, while China’s regulatory framework for outward FDI appears to be very
sophisticated, the approval process is complex, cumbersome, and can be slow.30
With the further growth of outward FDI, the approval process will have to be simpli-
fied considerably, if not replaced by mere notifications, unless it might collapse under
26 See ibid.
27 In practice, though, SOEs may benefit more from the home country measures that are available. For ex-
ample, the approval process may be faster for (especially large) SOEs; and SOEs (especially the central
ones) may have easier access to credit (typically an obstacle to SMEs everywhere—and most of China’s
outward investors are SMEs), especially if this finance comes from state-owned banks. Some of these
benefits may simply be related to size, and regardless of whether outward investors are SOEs or privately
owned enterprises. See ibid.
28 See MOFCOM: Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Chinese foreign investment joint venture
construction compilation, available at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfg/zcfb/dwtz/201303/1741680_
1.html (last visited 1 October 2014); MOFCOM: Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation,
Chinese foreign investment joint venture construction compilation—Preparation instructions, available at
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-06/01/content_1329230.htm; http://www.caep.org.cn/book/
.pdf; The Export–Import Bank of China, Environmental Impact
Assessment Framework, 2 January 2011, available at http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/medialist/index_
23_14365.html; The Export–Import Bank of China, Resettlement Policy Framework, 2 January 2011, avail-
able at http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/medialist/index_23_14367.html; China Banking Regulatory
Commission, Notice on Issuing the Green Credit Guidelines, 24 February, 2012, available at http://www.
cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID¼3CE646AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A; China Chamber of
Commerce of Metals, > , available at http://www.
syntao.com/Uploads/file/Public-Consultation_Draft_Guideline_Chinese.pdf.
29 See, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited 17
December 2014). UNCTAD reported that the three countries with the most BITs were Germany, China,
and France.
30 The last of these characteristics can create problems in the case of M&As when, at times, speedy decisions
are required.
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its own weight (given the growing number of Chinese MNEs and their foreign affili-
ates). Reform may, indeed, be in the offing as part of XI Jinpings broader reform ef-
forts; indicative of this change is that, beginning in May 2014, requiring only deals
valued at more than US$ 1 billion to be approved by the National Development and
Reform Commission, as compared to deals valued at more than US$ 100 million
previously.31 It would also be more efficient to create a one-stop shop for the various
measures available to qualifying outward investors. The combination of both
approaches, if pursued, would imply that control measures regarding outward FDI
would increasingly be replaced by incentives in order to support the government’s
broader economic development goals, making home country measures even more
important to encourage outward FDI that contributes as much as possible to the
country’s development.
Two, as already noted, China is in the process of becoming a net outward in-
vestor. One likely implication of this trend is that the government’s interest in pro-
tecting its outward investments and facilitating access to markets for its firms would
be further enhanced, perhaps eventually trumping its interest to protect its own firms
from inward FDI in certain sectors.32 This, in turn, most likely would have implica-
tions for the country’s policy stance on international investment agreements. The
watershed accord reached in July 2013 between the governments of China and the
USA (in the context of the USA–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue) to con-
tinue their negotiations of a BIT on the basis of pre-establishment national treatment
(i.e., granting foreign investors market access) and the negative list approach to ex-
ceptions from such treatment (i.e., listing sectors that are restricted to foreign in-
vestors, as opposed to sectors that are open to them)33 pinpoints the shift in
emphasis in the country’s perspective from a host country to a home country. At the
same time, it is of course entirely possible that this shift in approach was also
motivated–and perhaps greatly so–by the expectation that it could help in internal
economic reform processes (including capital-market and SOE reforms). For this
reason, the BIT negotiations (‘century negotiations’) between China and the USA
31 See National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, Order No. 9, 8 April
2014, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/wzly/zcfg/wzzcjwtz/201404/t20140410_606603.html.
(The reference is to NDRC No. 9 Order of 2014.) MOFCOM still uses the same review documents as
before, but is proposing a new document in which only sensitive areas/industries will require full reviews.
See MOFCOM Department of Treaty and Law, Commerce Department on ‘Overseas Investment
Management (Amendment) (draft)’ for public comment, available at http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/
201404/20140400551680.shtml (last visited 17 July 2014).
32 In fact, it may well be that certain industries might already have reached such a degree of competitiveness
that protection is no longer needed and hence opening up might not have any discernible impact on the
market dynamics in those industries. For example, if one takes the Internet sector (where foreign firms
have mostly either been excluded completely or restricted in their operations), China’s firms in that in-
dustry have gained such a degree of market dominance that it is difficult to see foreign firms competing
successfully in that industry. Rather, these Chinese firms are now beginning the early stages of their ‘going
out’ process, potentially posing a threat to the established dominant Western firms in overseas markets.
We are grateful to Louis Brennan for this insight.
33 ‘Important Outcomes in Economic Track in the Context of the Fifth-round of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue’, Xinhua (12 July 2013). The devil is, of course, in the detail: much will depend
on what kind of exceptions will be negotiated with future treaty partners and, as far as the negative list is
concerned, what industries will be placed on them.
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have at times been compared to the negotiations that led to China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization, in terms of the internal reform consequences this entry
brought with them.34 In any event, soon after this watershed accord, China’s State
Council approved (on 17 August 2013)—in a move reminiscent of the establish-
ment of the first special economic zone in Shenzen in 1980—a pilot free trade zone
in Shanghai35 that, among other things, will operate on the basis of a negative list of
exceptions for foreign investment.36 Other experimental free trade zones of this type
may well be established in due course.
Three, China is not the only country that pursues its own national objectives in
regard to the outward FDI of its firms and that has put home country measures into
place to promote these objectives. Virtually all developed countries (but only a few
developing ones) pursue—to a larger or lesser extent—similar policies and support
them through appropriate instruments.37 Hence, if home country measures become
an object of international negotiations, a number of countries would be directly
affected.
Nevertheless, in the view of a number of developed countries, helping firms to in-
vest abroad has become undesirable, at least when it involves SOEs. The principal
reason38 might well be that MNEs from emerging markets, and especially SOEs
34 According to a representative of the MOFCOM’s delegation negotiating the BIT, ‘the significance of the
China-US BIT negotiation is comparable to that of the WTO accession. While the WTO access negoti-
ation is related to opening up of trade, the BIT negotiation is related to the reform of the administrative
system of foreign investment and the opening up of foreign investment. Hence the BIT negotiation will
have more challenges but more profound implications’. See Jiang Wei,
(‘China-US BIT Negotiations advance to negoti-
ations on text’), 21st Century Business Herald (16 January 2014), available at http://jingji.21cbh.com/
2014/1-16/yMMDA2NTFfMTA0NTIyMA.html. Wang Xinkui of the Shanghai WTO Center put it even
stronger: ‘The China-US bilateral investment pact carries more significance than China’s accession into
the World Trade Organization.’ Li Jiabao, ‘China, US “pragmatic about pact” ’, China Daily Asia (16
January 2014), available at http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2014-01/16/content_15112679.
html (quoting Wang Xinkui).
35 See China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, Promote reform with opening-up and promote development
with innovations, available at http://en.shftz.gov.cn/homepage_note.html (last visited 2 August 2014). See
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, Regulations of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Zone (Adopted at the
14th Session of the Standing Committee of the 14th Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress of Shanghai on July
25, 2014), available at http://en.shftz.gov.cn/Government-affairs/Laws/General/319.shtml (last visited
25 July 2014). For a discussion, see Timothy P. Stratford and Scott Livingston, ‘The Third Wave?’,
Insight, November 2013, at 22, available at https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/
89B7633D-3682-4EBF-AC3F-F64D40151D1A/20363/1Cover1.pdf. The authors suggest that the
Shanghai FTZ ‘could signal the launch of a third wave of economic reform’. Ibid at 23.
36 For an unofficial translation of the negative list, see, American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai,
Negative List for Shanghai Free Trade Zone, available at http://amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/
88D66CDB-B8C8-42C8-BBA0-69E18E02EC72/20131/UnofficialTranslationNegativeListOctober2013.
pdf (last visited 2 August 2014). The Shanghai free trade zone is a pilot project; at the time of writing
this chapter, not all regulations had as yet been put in place, and the negative list was reportedly being
revised. See ‘The Compilation of the Negative List (2014 Version) Has Started’, China Business News, 20
December 2013, available at http://www.yicai.com/news/2013/12/3253248.html.
37 For an extensive analysis, see Karl P. Sauvant et al., ‘Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures and
Competitive Neutrality’, in Andrea Bjorklund (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy
(Oxford University Press, New York 2014) 2012–2013.
38 In the case of China’s rapidly rising outward FDI, furthermore, broader geo-political considerations
related to strategic competition may come into play, especially in the case of the USA.
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from China, have become significant outward investors.39 Such help, in the form of
home country measures, is seen as giving special advantages to SOEs,40 distorting in
this manner the competitive OFDI landscape in favor of these enterprises in the mar-
kets in which they invest. The relevant concept is ‘competitive neutrality’.41 In the
international context, this concept means that no entity in an international market
should have undue competitive advantages vis-a`-vis its competitors. Thus, measures
to help firms in their outward FDI, even when available equally to both public and
private entities, may in the future be evaluated in terms of their impact on competi-
tive neutrality.
The international discussions so far, however, have focused only on advantages
that are enjoyed by SOEs. This is the case in spite of the fact that, in the case of
countries that make such incentives available, home country measures are available
to both public and private firms and that there is no systematic evidence that home
country measures regularly provide SOEs with competitive advantages over their pri-
vate (or mixed) counterparts when engaging in FDI, and regardless of whether SOEs
are based in developed economies or emerging markets.42 A recent OECD study
came to the same conclusion when it noted regarding the types of advantages
granted to SOEs by governments with respect to cross-border activities: ‘[e]xisting
information on such advantages is often either anecdotal or limited to individual
cases.’43
The competitive neutrality discussions are being carried out in the OECD, but
this issue has also entered the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement44 and is expected to do so in other future negotiations,45 with a view to-
ward imposing disciplines on the availability of measures supporting outward FDI by
SOEs. Depending on the outcome of these negotiations and, in particular, future ne-
gotiations in which China might participate, the support that China’s SOEs obtain
when investing abroad may eventually become a difficult policy issue.
39 Outward FDI from all countries not classified by UNCTAD as ‘developed’ reached US$550 billion in
2013 (see UNCTAD, above n 2)—some eleven times of what world FDI flows were during the first half
of the 1980s.
40 SOEs—and, for that matter—also other enterprises may be able to draw on other advantages, e.g., when
they have a monopoly position in their domestic market. The discussion here focuses narrowly on specific
measures meant to help firms invest abroad.
41 The 2005 OECD ‘Guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises’ stipulate that ‘[t]he
legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-playing field in markets
where state-owned enterprises and private sector companies compete in order to avoid market distor-
tions.’ See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises at 18 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/cor
porategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/34803211.pdf.
42 See Sauvant et al., above n 37.
43 Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., ‘State-owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’, 147 OECD
Trade Policy Papers (2013) at 10.
44 For a discussion of the SOE issue in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, see David A. Glantz, ‘The
United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, in Bjorklund, above n 37.
45 For example, in the context of the negotiations a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. See
Office of the United States Trade Representative, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-of
fice/fact-sheets/2013/february/US-EU-TTIP (last visited 2 August 2014).
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I I . THE PERCEPTION AND RECEPTION OF CHINA’S
OUTWARD FDI IN HOST COUNTRIES
A. Rising scepticism
China’s outward FDI is facing rising scepticism. This is partly the result of the speed
with which this investment has grown; the leading role of SOEs in the country’s out-
ward FDI (and the associated concern that it could serve non-commercial purposes);
the negative effects that can be associated with FDI (such as the transfer of research-
and-development facilities from newly acquired firms to parent firms); the fear, espe-
cially regarding natural resource projects, that host countries do not get a fair deal in
the distribution of benefits from such projects (including when these projects em-
ploy primarily Chinese workers); perceived unfair competition, especially in the case
of SOEs (based on, e.g., the suspicion of subsidized financing); the negative image of
the home country in some host countries (related also to the fact that members of
the Chinese Communist Party are often in leading positions in Chinese MNEs); and
the fear that China’s outward FDI might compromise national security (especially re-
garding such investment in critical industries and infrastructure) while supporting
the country’s emergence as a global strategic competitor.46 A look of the most im-
portant host countries among developed countries emerging markets for China’s
outward FDI helps to throw more light on these matters.47
46 See, e.g., Hanemann, above n 7, at 54–61; Peter Drysdale and Christopher Findlay, Chinese Foreign
Direct Investment in the Australian Resource Sector’, in Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song and Wing Thye Woo
(eds), China’s New Place in a World in Crisis (Canberra: ANU Press, 2009) 349–388, available at http://
press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ch162.pdf; Cosima Cassel, Giuseppe de Candia and
Antonella Liberatore, ‘Building African Infrastructure with Chinese Money’, Paper (2010), available at
http://www.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/pdf/ITFD10Africa.pdf; Xiaofang Shen, Private Chinese Investment in
Africa: Myths and Realities (Washington: World Bank, 2013), mimeo; and Transparency matters: disclos-
ure of payments to governments by Chinese extractive companies, Global Witness (January 2013), avail-
able at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/transparency_matters_lr.pdf. Some of
these fears accompanied also the rise of Japan as an outward investor in the 1980s. For a study of the re-
actions in the USA to this rise, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘Is the US ready for FDI from China? Lessons from
Japan’s experience in the 1980s’, in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Investing in the United States: Is the US Ready for
FDI from China? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) 185–208. And a number of these concerns (as well
as others) were traditionally also voiced by developing and other countries, see UNCTAD, World
Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development (Geneva: UNCTAD,
1999).
47 Extensive research was conducted between early September 2013 and the end of March 2014 on the fol-
lowing countries, primarily using Google to locate local newspapers, institutions, and government web-
sites, as well as the Factiva database, and focusing on the years 2012 and 2013; some 700 items were
consulted (in a number of cases, the Chrome translation service was utilized): Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mexico,
Mongolia, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, the UK, the USA, and Zambia;
in addition research was undertaken for the European Union as a whole, reflecting the fact that, after the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the Union has exclusive authority in the FDI
area. These countries, plus other members of the European Union, accounted for some two-thirds of
China’s outward FDI stock in 2011 and a somewhat higher share of China’s average FDI outflows during
2009–2011 (as reported by MOFCOM), not counting Chinese FDI in the tax havens and financial cen-
ters mentioned earlier in the text. See MOFCOM, above n 10. (Note, however, the observation made ear-
lier that the MOFCOM data do not provide an accurate picture about the ultimate destination of China’s
outward FDI, precisely because most of it is channeled via financial centers and tax havens.) The research
was done for English language publications and in each country’s official language (except for Indonesia
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Overall, FDI from China receives considerable attention in most of the countries
researched, even though it is relatively small in the great majority of them, both in
absolute amounts and relative to the sums invested by firms from other countries.
Moreover, such investment is regarded with some trepidation in most (if not all)
countries researched. This is true especially for M&As, for which (apart from na-
tional security reasons and competition issues) economic reasons can include that
M&As may lead to lay-offs, the closing down of production lines and the transfer of
research-and-development capacities to the parent firms (all concerns also known
from M&As undertaken by MNEs headquartered in other countries). At the same
time, it is recognized that M&As can save firms that otherwise may be failing.
Chinese greenfield investment, on the other hand, is generally welcome, although
there are issues in the case of FDI in natural resources and telecommunications.
Perceptions of incoming Chinese FDI are not uniform across constituencies
within countries, however, nor are reactions to it across countries.
B. The media
In most of the host countries to Chinese FDI that were researched, newspapers tend
to represent a more critical constituency—but, again, unevenly so. Everywhere, the
rise of incoming Chinese FDI (and especially important Chinese acquisitions) re-
ceive attention, far out of proportion of the relative importance of Chinese inward
FDI compared with that from other countries.48 Headlines in newspapers read, for
example: ‘Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese drag-
on’,49 ‘Kazakh opposition calls for halt to Chinese expansion’,50 ‘Chinese investment
and aid in Cambodia a controversial affair’,51 ‘Chinese investment in Mongolia: An
and Saudi Arabia) to obtain the relevant information. To the extent possible, official statements from
each country’s administration as well as parliamentary debates related to new legislations affecting
Chinese outward FDI were consulted. In addition, a good part of the information found was contained in
both domestic and international newspapers and, in some cases, research papers. Research for Germany
was conducted by Schahram Ghalebegi, The Perception and Reception of China’s FDI in Germany (Berlin
School of Economics and Law, Berlin April 2014) (on file with the authors); research for Kazakhstan and
Russia was conducted by Andrei Panibratov, Perceptions of Chinese FDI in Neighboring Emerging
Economies: Different Groups’ Opinions in Russia and Kazakhstan (St. Petersburg State University, St.
Petersburg May 2014) (on file with the authors); and research for all other countries was conducted by
Camilla Gambarini, Nancy Lee and Adrian Torres, The Perception and Reception of China’s Outward FDI
in Key Host Countries (New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, April 2014) (on file with
the authors).
48 In 2012, for example, the USA received US$ 4 billion in FDI from China, accounting for 5% of the total;
Kazakhstan received US$ 3 billion, accounting for 3% of the total; the UK received US$ 3 billion, ac-
counting for 3% of the total; Australia received US$ 2 billion, accounting for 3% of the total; and
Indonesia received US$ 1 billion, accounting for 2% of the total. See MOFCOM, 2012 Statistical Bulletin
of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 36 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012). In a few countries
however, like Cambodia, China accounts for a substantial share of inward FDI flows.
49 Kevin Gallagher, Latin America Playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon, The Guardian
(30 May 2013, 2:00 PM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-mat
ters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon.
50 Robin Paxton, Kazakh opposition calls for halt to China expansion, Reuters (28 May 2011, 10:57 AM), avail-
able at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/28/kazakhstan-china-protest-idUKLDE74R02M20110528.
51 Heng Pheakdey, Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia a controversial affair, East Asia Forum (16 July
2013), available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/16/chinese-investment-and-aid-in-cambodia-
a-controversial-affair/.
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uneasy courtship between David and Goliath’,52 and ‘Fears over growing Chinese in-
dustry in Laos’.53. National security concerns are particularly salient in the USA,
France,54 and the UK.55 Chinese FDI in natural resources sectors receives attention
in natural resource-rich countries, such as Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and
Zambia. The fear is that, when critical resources are controlled from abroad,56 the
benefits associated with such projects may not be equitably distributed between for-
eign investors and host countries, including because labor is often imported from
China and working conditions may be poor.57 Media concerns in Australia also relate
to the worry that strong Chinese investment in Australian real estate is leading to a
real estate bubble.58 Other media criticism involves broader negative effects such in-
vestment can bring. For example, in France it was claimed (in relation to Chinese ac-
quisitions of enterprises in key sectors of the European and French economies) that
‘China’s cooperation dialogue usually hides the will of power and fast profits’.59 In
52 Justin Li, Chinese investment in Mongolia: an uneasy courtship between David and Goliath, East Asia
Forum (2 February 2011), available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/02/chinese-investment-
in-mongolia-an-uneasy-courtship-between-goliath-and-david/.
53 Conor Woodman, Fears over growing Chinese industry in Laos, BBC News (28 May 2011), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9498760.stm.
54 M. Jean-Marie Bockelf, Rapport d’Information fait au nom de la commission des affaires e´trange`res de la
de´fense et des forces arme´es sur la cyberde´fense (Paris: French Senate, 18 July 2012), available at http://
www.senat.fr/rap/r11-681/r11-6811.pdf (noting that, while the USA and Australia have banned the use
of Chinese routers for reasons of national security (i.e., Chinese enterprises may be connected to the gov-
ernment and there are suppositions of cyber espionage), such a ban does not exist in the European
Union. According to the author of the report, it is indispensable that the Commission introduces a ban
on the use of routers from China because it affects national security).
55 Brian Wheeler, Is it a good idea to allow China a stake in UK nuclear?, BCC (Oct. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24563535 (reporting several concerns on the potential participa-
tion of Chinese companies in United Kingdom nuclear power plants) .
56 In Latin America and the Caribbean, Chinese FDI in natural resources accounted for an average of almost
90% of the country’s FDI in the region during 2007–2011 (compared to a share of 25% for all foreign in-
vestors in that region). See Taotao Chen and Miguel Perez Ludena, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago: ECLAC, 2014) 13. Together with the high share of natural re-
sources in China’s imports from Latin America (70%, see ibid.), this has given rise to the fear that a new
center-periphery relationship is in the making. See also Miguel Perez Ludena, ‘Is Chinese FDI Pushing
Latin America into Natural Resources?’, 63 Column FDI Perspective (19 March 2012).
57 In response to the low wages offered by Chinese firms, the Zambian government raised the minimum
wage (which came into effect on 4 July 2012). See Zambia: dreaming of a minimum wage, IRIN News (10
July 2012), available at http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/96073/zambia-dreaming-of-a-minimum-wage.
58 Vesna Nazor, China’s appetite for Aussie real estate sparks boom, SBS News (6 November 2013), avail-
able at http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/11/06/chinas-appetite-aussie-real-estate-sparks-boom.
59 Philippe Delalande, Les investissements chinois en France: les craindre ou les souhaiter, Le Monde (15
October 2012), available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/10/15/les-investissements-chi
nois-en-france-les-craindre-ou-les-souhaiter_1775602_3232.html. (‘les Franc¸ais devront se de´partir d’une
certaine naı¨vete´ face aux Chinois. Ils se laissent se´duire pas les discours chinois sur la coope´ration qui
masquent souvent une volonte´ de puissance et de profits rapides. Et ils sont de´contenance´s par la collu-
sion constante en Chine des autorite´s politiques et des entreprises, contraire a` leur conception de l’e´cono-
mie de marche´. L’Europe doit re´former son droit pour se pre´server des risques que comportent les
investissements chinois et ne retenir que ceux qui lui seront be´ne´fiques. Elle pourrait s’inspirer de la le´gis-
lation chinoise dont la priorite´ est toujours la pre´servation des inte´reˆts de la Chine. A de´faut, on peut
craindre que le capital productif et patrimonial de l’Europe ne passe, sans profit pour elle, sous la coupe
chinoise plus vite qu’on le pense.’). See also De grands patrons chinois en escale a` Paris pour chercher in-
spiration et investissements, AFP (24 June 2013), available at http://lentreprise.lexpress.fr/de-grands-
patrons-chinois-a-paris-pour-chercher-inspiration-et-investissements_1527422.html (‘les investisseurs
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Cambodia, the activities of Chinese firms have been criticized for severely damaging
the environment.60 In Mongolia, the influx of foreign laborers, particularly Chinese,
has been noted negatively, especially since many Mongolians remain unemployed.61
In Indonesia, the lack of integration of Chinese enterprises into the country’s society,
which includes a very complex traditional social system, were criticized.62
On the other hand, other newspapers—often the business press in some
countries63—are neutral in tone, and headlines focus on, e.g., ‘New study shows no
evidence of German “industrial crown jewels” sell off to China’,64 ‘Chinese firms to
invest 700m in Holland’,65 ‘China keen on investing in Brazil infrastructure, man-
ufacturing’,66 ‘Chinese investment funds target Singapore properties’,67 and ‘Kenny
sells the Irish as “a great bunch of lads” ’.68
Again other media focus on positive aspects, reflected in such articles as ‘Made in
Italy: Investimenti cinesi, Stanca: spesso un bene per l’Italia’;69 ‘Le de´veloppement
de la Chine n’est pas une menace mais une opportunite´’;70 ‘India invites foreign
chinois ont mene´ ces dernie`res anne´es une offensive sur les vignobles franc¸ais, engrangeant une trentaine
de chaˆteaux du Bordelais et GevreyChambertin en Bourgogne.’) Interestingly, the author of the article
uses the word ‘une offensive’.
60 Heng Pheakdey, Chinese investment and aid in Cambodia a controversial affair, East Asia Forum (16 July
2013), available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/16/chinese-investment-and-aid-in-cambodia-
a-controversial-affair/ (noting that, while Chinese investment and aid is much needed for economic de-
velopment, China’s unquestioning approach to how its aid and investment money is distributed and used
has exacerbated corruption, deteriorated good governance and human rights, and ruined Cambodia’s re-
sources and natural environment. Moreover, human rights activists have often accused Chinese textile fac-
tories of abusing worker’s rights, while China’s hydropower investments have destroyed protected areas,
forest biodiversity and wildlife habitat.). See also Concern over Chinese investment, Radio Free Asia (7
February 2013), available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/china-02072013175545.html.
61 M. Zoljarga, Contractors bring illegal workers while Mongolians remain unemployed, The UB Post (17
December 2013), available at http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/?p¼7031.
62 Great Han Samarinda, Investment from China’s enterprises, The Jakarta Post (21 September 2012), avail-
able at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/21/your-letters-investment-china-s-enterprises.
html.
63 For example, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Manager Magazine in Germany and Il Sole 24 Ore
in Italy.
64 See Press Release, BGM Associates, Dragons and Tigers Hunting in Germany: Chinese and Indian
Acquisitions of German Firms 2002-2012, available at http://www.bgmassociates.com/news.html. The
study found that Chinese acquisitions were mainly motivated by the desire to acquire technologies, know-
ledge and brands.
65 Chinese firms to invest E700m in Holland, Dutch News (30 October 2009), available at http://www.
dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/10/chinese_firms_to_invest_700m_i.php.
66 Gerald Jeffris, China Keen on Investing In Brazil Infrastructure, Manufacturing, The Wall Street Journal
(10 May 2013, 6:07 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130510-715152.html.
67 Jacquelyn Cheock, Chinese investment funds target Singapore properties, The Business Times (3
September 2013), available at http://www.stproperty.sg/articles-property/singapore-property-news/chi
nese-investment-funds-target-singapore-properties-cbre/a/135247.
68 Fiach Kelly, Kenny sells the Irish as ‘a great bunch of lads, Irish Independent (21 February 2012), available
at http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/fiach-kelly-kenny-sells-the-irish-as-a-great-bunch-of-lads-
26823861.html.
69 Sonia Montrella, Made in Italy: Investimenti cinesi, Stanca: spesso un bene per l’Italia [‘Made in Italy:
Chinese Investment, Stanca: usually a good opportunity for Italy’], AgiChina 24 (18 January 2013), avail-
able at http://www.agichina24.it/in-primo-piano/made-in-italy/notizie/investimenti-cinesi-stancabr-/
spesso-un-bene-per-lrsquoitaliabr-.
70 Le de´veloppement de la Chine n’est pas une menace mais une opportunite´, French.people.com.cn (25
September 2013), available at http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/International/8410014.html.
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direct investment from China’;71 ‘Fear of Chinese investment misses the economic
point’;72 ‘Chinese firms act for profit, not state’;73 and ‘Messieurs les Chinois, inves-
tissez svp’.74 In the USA, e.g., Chinese investments in depressed areas, such as
Detroit, were positively commented upon.75 In the Netherlands and Luxembourg,
there was little negative public opinion, perhaps because Chinese investments there
typically require relatively higher-skilled labor.
C. The business community
The business community itself does not appear to be strongly engaged in the public de-
bate on this subject. Big business—out of self-interest—typically supports an open
international investment regime that provides strong protections for investors and in-
vestments and access to markets. Moreover, China is an important export market and
host country for many firms, making the enterprises involved reluctant to advocate re-
strictive policies, for fear of retaliation. However, it may well be that firms and busi-
ness associations lobby the government to take action, especially because of perceived
competitive threats, and the arrival of new competitors is not always welcome. In the
case of FDI by SOEs, moreover, concerns about possible competitive advantages of
these enterprises come into play. In fact, the Business Coalition for Transatlantic
Trade (BCTT—the most important US business coalition for the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations) is a driving force to impose discip-
lines on SOEs, in the context of outward FDI and competitive neutrality.76 BCTT’s
71 India invites foreign direct investment from China, The Economic Times (28 February 2013), available at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-27/news/37331014_1_chinese-companies-china-
s-jaishankar-mutual-investment.
72 Wenran Jiang, Fear of Chinese investment misses the economic point, Edmonton Journal (15 February
2012), available at http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/ideas/story.html?id¼763d030e-
f0d3-4f45-8fe9-7e64d2221a1f.
73 Peter O’Neil, Chinese firms act for profit, not state, Vancouver Sun (22 February 2012), available at
http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/archives/story.html?id¼ce11da98-bbf1-4040-a95b-29eafb
fb887a.
74 Messieurs les Chinois, investissez svp, La Libre.be (2 June 2006), available at http://www.lalibre.be/econ
omie/actualite/messieurs-les-chinois-investissez-svp-51b88ec9e4b0de6db9ae0ead.
75 Kathy Chen, U.S. cities seek to woo Chinese investment, The Wall Street Journal (6 April 2010), available
at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303410404575151593460208482.
76 Most major USA associations and major companies are members of BCTT. Under the heading
‘Disciplines for State Favored Commercial Actors’, a short basic paper on competition policy lists the fol-
lowing among BCTT’s objectives regarding state-owned/state-favored commercial actors:
Discipline government financial advantages provided on a preferential access and non-commercial
basis to these entities.
Discipline government non-financial/regulatory treatment, including prohibiting selective en-
forcement of laws and regulations that is often done in a manner that is partial to these entities.
Ensure that a government is accountable for these entities’ decisions in the market that are pro-
ven to be discriminatory or made as a result of government influence and not conducted in ac-
cordance with commercial consideration.
The obligations to address all of these distortions are subject to dispute settlement.
Competition Policy, Business Coalition for Transatlantic Trade (BCTT), available at http://www.transat
lantictrade.org/issues/competition-policy/ (last visited 25 July 2014).
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position is very similar to that of the US Business Coalition for TPP (the Trans-
Pacific Partnership).77
D. Trade unions
Trade unions, too, do not seem to be that engaged. This is somewhat surprising since
many of Chinese firms’ M&As involve firms that are in difficulty or even insolvent,78
and the consequences of such situations typically involve lay-offs. On the other hand,
if such firms are taken over and continue as going concerns, this is a positive devel-
opment. In the end, trade union welcome any investment, whether domestic or for-
eign, that creates or maintains jobs, as long a working conditions are fully in line
with domestic legislation, or even better.79 At the same time, at least the AFL-CIO is
concerned about FDI by SOEs in the USA, fearing that it is asset-stripping or con-
sists only of toehold investment.80
77 This Coalition has, among its Principles the following:
11. An agreement that promotes fair competition and a level playing field
A successful TPP agreement should ensure a level playing field by protecting and promoting the
competitive process through strong rules on transparency and due process in competition-policy
proceedings. In addition, this agreement should ensure that state- owned, state-invested and
state-favored industries compete on a level playing field with private and foreign companies.
See Principles, U.S. Business Coalition for TPP, available at http://tppcoalition.org/about/(last visited
26 August 2014).
78 In Germany, a leading European host country for Chinese firms, a 2013 study found that, of the 46 for-
eign affiliates covered in the study and taken over by BRIC investors, 33% were insolvent or insolvency
proceedings had been initiated. Among these 46 firms, 15 were Chinese affiliates; the overall insolvency
rate appears to apply to them as well (there were about 615 Chinese foreign affiliates in Germany in
2013). See Kai Bollhorn and Sophie Golinski, BRIC-Investitionen in Deutschland: Mythen & Realitaet
(Marburg/Leipzig: Phillips-Universitaet/Leibniz-Institut fuer Laenderkunde, 2013). The study was
undertaken for the Hans Boeckler Stiftung, a foundation close to Germany’s trade unions.
79 To quote Celeste Drake of The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO): ‘We support increased investment of all kinds, including foreign and domestic, so long as
the investments help grow our economy and create good job opportunities.’ See Celeste Drake,
‘Testimony for the Hearing: “Discussion draft of H.R.___, The Global Investment in American Jobs Act
of 2013” before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade’ at 1 (Washington
D.C.: AFL-CIO, 18 April 2013).
80 ‘A looming threat—that of increased outward investment by Chinese SOEs—is also on the horizon. US
firms will increasingly face unfair direct competition in the US by Chinese SOEs operating here as they
scour the globe for investment opportunities resulting from the huge cache of funds they have amassed
from their protectionist and predatory policies. To date, such investment has taken the form of either
asset stripping of distressed companies or “toehold” investments to ensure market access and has oper-
ated to maximize employment within China at the cost of employment in the target countries.’ Letter
from R. Thomas Buffenbarger, Chair, Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade
Policy (President, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers), to Terry McCartin,
Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative for China Affairs regarding the Labor Advisory Committee
Input for the Tenth WTO Transitional Review Mechanism for China, 12 August 2011, available at http:/
www.afm.org/uploads/file/LACChina.pdf (last visited 13 October 2014). Consequently, ‘We believe that
the USTR should ensure that SOEs and any other entities acting with state-delegated authority do not
undermine the competitiveness of private enterprise or the rights, pay, and benefits available to their
workers. Nor should these entities be allowed to skew supply chains or engage in predatory practices in
the U.S. or third country markets, thereby destroying jobs for American workers.’ Testimony of Thea
Mei Lee, Deputy Chief of Staff, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
Before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, China’s Compliance with the WTO and
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Finally, governments, i.e., the Executive and legislative bodies, reflect the conflicted at-
titude of other stakeholders. On balance, however, the Executives of the countries
that were researched maintain a welcoming attitude, not only regarding incoming
FDI in general, but also regarding such investment from China. For instance, in May
2007, the President of the USA, George W. Bush, issued a statement on ‘Open
Economies’,81 reaffirming the country’s openness to FDI. (The statement was
released just before the Foreign Investment and National Security Act was enacted,
which strengthened the country’s M&A review process.) Moreover, governments
from all parts of the world have supported missions to China to attract investment,
and often competition for such investment takes also place at the sub-national level
(e.g., in the USA).82 Chinese FDI was especially welcome in the European countries
most affected by the Euro crisis, at times as a means to forestall the bankruptcy of
domestic firms and to re-launch economic growth.83 Some countries even intro-
duced regulations to facilitate such investment, e.g., by simplifying the visa process.84
International Trade Rules (15 January 2014) at 7, available at http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommis
sion.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%20WTO%20-%20Thea%20Lee%20Written%20Statement.
pdf.
81 Press Release, President Bush’s Statement on Open Economies, The White House Archives (10 May
2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070510-3.
html.
82 Business ties between China and The Netherlands intensified, Dutch Daily News (21 September 2012),
available at http://www.dutchdailynews.com/business-ties-between-china-and-the-netherlands-intensi
fied/; Hollande encourage les relations commerciales avec la Chine, Les Echos (25 June 2013), available
at http://afase.org/fr; in Latin America, Chile was particularly active in seeking to attract Chinese FDI
(see Acuerdo que dinamizara´ el comercio de servicios entre Chile y China serı´a aprobado antes de la visita
del Presidente Hu Jintao, Senado de la Republica, 13 April 2010, available at http://www.senado.cl/ (last
visited 4 August 2014); Comisio´n de Relaciones Exteriores apoyo´ el acuerdo suplementario con China,
Senado la Republica, 16 August 2013, available at http://www.senado.cl/ (last visited 4 August 2014);
Visan ocho acuerdos internacionales que profundizan materias de seguridad, comercio, cultura y reciproc-
idad diploma´tica, 4 September 2013, available at http://www.senado.cl/ (last visited 4 August 2014);
Sesio´n 53a, Ordinaria, en mie´rcoles 4 de septiembre de 2013, 6 September 2013, available at http://
www.senado.cl/, last accessed on 4 August 2014 Kathy Chen, U.S. cities seek to woo Chinese investment,
The Wall Street Journal (6 April 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303410404575151593460208482.
83 See, e.g., Montrella, above n 68. See Sergey Filippov, European Investment Promotion Agencies vis-a`-vis
Multinational Companies from Emerging Economies: Com-parative Analysis of BRIC Investor Targeting
(Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, 2012), for a discussion relevant here.
84 Reportedly, Ireland and Spain introduced new visa regulations specifically with Chinese investors in
mind. Ireland introduced the Immigration Scheme for Investors and Entrepreneurs in 2012. In adopting
this Scheme, the Ministry of Justice and Equality underlined that the implementing measures are not
unique internationally and Ireland should compete with other countries (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the
UK) to attract migrant investors and entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and mainland China. See Immigrant
Investor Programme and Start-up Entrepreneur Scheme: Statements, House of the Oireachts (9 February
2012), available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/seanad/2012/02/09/00006.asp.
As to Spain, the country’s Parliament passed the new law for entrepreneurs in September 2013, Ley 14/
2013, available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/09/28/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-10074.pdf. Its Article 63
provides for a special visa for investors making considerable investments in Spain. The new rules facilitate
the obtainment of visa for foreign investors from China (and Russia). See Statement by the Secretary of the
Ministry of Commerce and Competition, Mr. Jaime-Garcia Legaz, reported in Mo´nica Cebario Belaza, El
Gobierno planea otorgar la residencia a quienes compren pisos de 160.000 euros, EL PAI´S (19 November 2012),
available at http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/11/19/actualidad/1353320638_988833.html; Ferran
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In Belgium,85 Brazil,86 Germany,87 and the UK,88 government officials encouraged
incoming Chinese FDI. In Russia, the highest authorities welcome Chinese FDI (al-
though there are also fears that China’s role might become too strong).89 The same
approach appears to prevail in Kazakhstan90 (including to balance the country’s rela-
tionship with Russia) and Saudi Arabia (to mitigate its petrodollar dependency).91
South-East Asian countries, for their part, are tightly linked with China through glo-
bal value chains,92 and governments therefore regard Chinese FDI as a positive fac-
tor for their development and have actively sought it.93
But the Executives of a number of countries also have concerns and, in any event,
are subject to pressure from their Legislatures, or individual members (or group of
members) of such bodies. Concerns relate to the various issues mentioned at the be-
ginning of this section, especially in the areas of national security and the role of
SOEs in China’s outward FDI. Security concerns are particularly pronounced in the
USA, were the issue of cyber-security (particularly in the area of telecommunica-
tions) adds an additional dimension.94 In Australia and Canada, governmental con-
cerns focus more on the control of natural resources and the net benefits associated
Ferrer, Residencia en Espan˜a, a cambio de inversio´n inmobiliaria, El Paı´s (17 September 2013), available at
http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2013/09/17/vivienda/1379441954_406528.html.
85 Chen Jia, Wealth fund to help Chinese companies invest, China Daily (3 May 2013), available at http://
europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-05/03/content_15195452.htm.
86 A. Moreira, Para atrair investimentos chineses, Brasil promete seguranc¸a jurı´dica, Portos E Navios (6
November 2013), available at http://www.portosenavios.com.br/geral/21586-para-atrair-investimentos-
chineses-brasil-promete-seguranca-juridica.
87 See, e.g., Bruederle lehnt Schutzwall gegen auslaendische Investitionen ab, DAPD Nachrichtenagentur, (27
December 2010), available at http://www.themenportal.de/nachrichten/bruederle-lehnt-schutzwall-
gegen-auslaendische-investitionen-ab-46024 (mentioning that Germany’s Minister of Economics,
Bruederle, explicitly invited Chinese FDI to Europe and especially Germany).
88 Matt Warman, London will offer China more than Singapore can, The Telegraph (12 October 2013),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10373854/London-will-offer-China-
more-than-Singapore-can-says-Boris-Johnson.html.
89 Panibratov, above n 47.
90 Ibid. See also Daniel O’ Neill, China’s Support for Investment in Kazakhstan: Good Neighbor, Good
Economics or Good Geopolitics? (Saint Luis: Washington University, 2009), available at http://www.irex.
org/resource/chinas-support-investment-kazakhstan-good-neighbor-good-economics-or-good-geopolitics-
resea.
91 Saudi Arabia and China team up to build a gigantic new oil refinery – is this the beginning of the end for
the petrodollar?, Alt-Market (22 March 2012), available at http://www.alt-market.com/articles/1446-
saudi-arabia-and-china-team-up-is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-the-petrodollar.
92 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains. Investment and Trade for Development
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013).
93 See, e.g., Eka Utami Aprilia, China asked to invest in shipping, Tempo (24 November 2010); China to in-
crease investment in Indonesian fisheries industry, Kompas Cyber Media (22 September 2010); Indonesia
insists China to support joint ventures, Indonesian Government News (28 March 2010).
94 See Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Investigative Report on the
U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, H. R. Rep.
(8 October 2012), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/docu
ments/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. Cyber-security is also a concern
in the United Kingdom. See Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure: The implications for
National Security, Intelligence and Security Committee, Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind,
MP, June 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/205680/ISC-Report-Foreign-Investment-in-the-Critical-National-Infrastructure.pdf, last ac-
cessed on 25 July 2014 (The report addresses the Huawei’s threat to the Telecommunication sector of
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with their exploitation (mirroring the discussions in media), although other tests
(including national security) are employed as well. The discussions surrounding the
take-over of Australia’s Lynas95 and the acquisition of Canada’s Nexen96 exemplify
this. In the Latin American countries researched, it does not appear that Chinese
FDI issues have figured noticeably in parliamentary discussions. But in India, 19
questions relating to FDI from China were asked in the Lower House of Parliament
and 19 in the Upper House during the period 7 July 2009 and 22 February 2014,
with 10 of these questions involving national security.97 The perhaps best-known
parliamentary reaction was a 2005 resolution adopted by the US House of
Representatives condemning, in a vote of 138 to 15, the attempted take-over of the
US firm Unocal by CNOOC of China.98
These various cross-cutting pressures are reflected in the fact that a number of
countries have strengthened or established review mechanisms for incoming FDI,
focused on M&As by SOEs (and also, before the Western financial crisis, by sover-
eign wealth funds). This involves walking a fine line balancing the mitigation of con-
cerns with maintaining an investment climate that remains attractive to (in this case)
Chinese MNEs. The focus of these mechanisms is on national security and net bene-
fits for the host country (especially concerning technology-intensive industries and
critical infrastructure, as well as natural resource industries), including concerns
about SOEs benefitting from various subsidies that put them in a competitive advan-
tage vis-a`-vis domestic firms.
While the competitive advantage concern has been taken up (as mentioned ear-
lier) in international negotiations (that are likely to be of particular interest to
China), a number of countries have strengthened their mechanisms to review incom-
ing M&As, to make sure that such transactions are in their national interest. The ac-
tions taken by the USA, Canada, and Australia exemplify this approach.
the United Kingdom and the potential issues of cyber attacks. Most of the concerns surrounding Huawei
relate to its perceived links to the Chinese government.)
95 Cole Latimer et al., China’s rare earth monopoly threatens global suppliers, rival producers claim, The
Financial Times (29 May 2009), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/75fe65ce-4c4e-11de-a6c5-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz349iZ5X6C; China’s CNMC to acquire Australia’s Lynas for A$505 million,
Domain–b.com (2 May 2009), available at http://www.domain-b.com/industry/Mining/20090502_
china_nonferrous.html; see also Bruno A., Growing bilateral ties between Australia and China may benefit
Lynas, Investor Intel (29 May 2014), available at http://investorintel.com/rare-earth-intel/growing-bilat
eral-ties-australia-china-may-benefit-lynas-corp/.
96 Ian Austen, Canada clears $15 billion Chinese takeover of an energy company, New York Times (7
December 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/canada-clears-15-billion-chinese-
takeover-of-an-energy-company/?_php¼true&_type¼blogs&_r¼0; Nathan Vaderklippe, Investment deal
with China coming in ‘short order, The Globe and Mail (16 October 2013), available at http://www.theglo
beandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/asian-pacific-business/investment-deal-with-china-
coming-in-short-order-baird/article14884704/ (noting that, although the deal was eventually approved, the
CNOOC takeover of Nexen was accompanied by ‘new handcuffs on SOEs, whose ability to do big deals,
particularly in the oil sands, now appears to be limited’.).
97 This is, however, a small percentage of all 1185 questions asked during this period. Still, they show the sa-
liency of Chinese FDI in India; on the other hand, no other country received more questions related to
FDI and national security. See Premila Nazareth Satyanand, Policy Brief, What do India’s MPs want to
know about FDI? (2 July 2009–21 February 2014), New Dehli National Council of Applied Economic
Research” (forthcoming).
98 H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hres344/
text.
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In the USA, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act,99 adopted by the
US Congress in 2007, strengthens the role of the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the USA (itself established in 1988, as a reaction to the rapid growth of Japanese
FDI in the USA) to review incoming M&As. Among other things, it requires that in-
coming M&As by state-controlled entities need not only to be notified but also are
(in principle) subject to investigations.100
The Government of Canada had issued ‘Guidelines: Investment by state-owned
enterprises. Net benefit assessment’101 in December 2007, to clarify the investment
process as applicable to acquisitions of a certain size by SOEs. The continued growth
of M&As by such firms led the Government to issue further clarifications in
December 2012, in a ‘Statement Regarding Investment by Foreign State-Owned
Enterprises’.102 The Statement provided that, ‘For the purposes of evaluating pro-
posed investments by foreign SOEs, Section 20 of the ICA [Investment Canada Act]
and supporting Guidelines require that the investor satisfies the Minister of the in-
vestment’s commercial orientation; freedom from political influence; adherence to
Canadian laws, standards and practices that promote sound corporate governance
and transparency; and positive contributions to the productivity and industrial effi-
ciency of the Canadian business.’ It continues to say: ‘Each case will be examined on
its own merits; however, given the inherent risks posed by foreign SOE acquisitions
in the Canadian oil sands the Minister of Industry will find the acquisition of control
of a Canadian oil sands business by a foreign SOE to be net benefit to Canada on an
exceptional basis only.’103 In June 2013, then, the Canadian Parliament amended the
Canada Investment Act, specifying the threshold for reviewable private foreign in-
vestment and for reviewable foreign SOE investment and spelling out a definition of
SOEs.104
The Government of Australia announced in February 2008 a new policy (consist-
ing of a set of principles) that require the Treasurer to examine a number of specific
issues when considering applications for investments by foreign governments and
their agencies, including whether an investor’s operations are independent from the
relevant foreign government, whether the investor observes common standards of
business behavior, whether the investment may have an impact on the country’s
99 Foreign Investment and National Security Act, Public Law 110–149 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr556enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr556enr.pdf.
100 For a discussion of the Act, see David N. Fagan, The US regulatory and institutional framework for FDI,
in Sauvant, above n 46, at 4–-84.
101 See Government of Canada News Release, Policy Statement and Revised Guidelines for Investments by
State-Owned Enterprises (7 December 2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.
do?nid¼711489. In releasing these guidelines, the Government outlined some of its key considerations
to be taken into account when reviewing incoming FDI projects by SOEs, reflecting the concern that
foreign SOEs could present certain risks: ‘First, foreign SOEs are, although to varying degrees, inher-
ently susceptible to foreign government influence that may be inconsistent with Canadian national in-
dustrial and economic objectives. Second, SOE acquisitions of Canadian businesses may also have
adverse effects on the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness of those companies, which may have
negative effects on the Canadian economy in the longer term.’
102 See ibid.
103 See ibid.
104 See Investment Canada Act, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-21.8/page-3.html#h-9
and http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/I-21.8.pdf.
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national security, and what the contribution of an investment is to the country’s
economy and broader community.105 Reportedly, the influx of Chinese investment
triggered this action.106
The principal purpose of these measures taken by these three countries was to
create the tools to block, if need be, undesirable M&As—not only from China, but
also from firms headquartered in other countries.107 However, it is noteworthy that
these actions took place—in fact, were triggered—when China’s outward FDI began
to rise rapidly, and that the screening mechanisms are particularly strong for M&As
undertaken by SOEs.
From China’s perspective, government activities that impact Chinese (SOE-
dominated) outward FDI through host country review mechanisms are, not surpris-
ingly, of concern, creating an interest to address this subject in international invest-
ment agreements. In fact, all countries that have some kind of review mechanism
would want to protect it in their international investment agreements.
In sum, the perception and reception of China’s growing outward FDI in the
country’s principal host countries has been decidedly mixed, both regarding the entry
strategies of Chinese MNEs into host countries (M&As vs. greenfield investments)
and the perception of, and reactions to, such investment by (and within) various
host country constituencies.108 This was recently recognized publicly in China. To
quote the Governor of China’s Central Bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, ‘Different entities
have behaved differently. There may have been some phenomena of Chinese
105 Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, available at http://www.firb.gov.au/content/policy.asp (last vis-
ited); see Australian Government, Foreign Investment Review Board, 2008/2009 Annual Report at 7,
available at http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualReports/2008-2009/_downloads/
2008-09_FIRB_AR.pdf. The Treasurer is already obliged, under the ‘Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act 1975,’ to determine whether proposed foreign investments. The Treasurer is already
obliged, under the ‘Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975’, to determine whether proposed for-
eign investments above a certain amount are consistent with Australia’s national interest (which is not
defined). See Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/
Details/C2013C00089.
106 Peter Cai, Delicate balancing act for the foreign investment board, The Sydney Morning Herald (26




107 This may well be part of a broader reassessment of the role of FDI in national economies, at least as far
as M&As are concerned. This is exemplified by the decree issued by the government of France in 15
May 2014, at the time when both GE (USA) and Siemens (Germany) were interested in acquiring a
part of the French firm Alstom. See Michael Stothard, France widens its powers to stop foreign acquisi-
tions, Financial Times (17–18 May 2014) at 9. This decree toughens an existing measure by giving the
government an effective veto over M&As in an expanded list of industries.
108 There is, however, one area in which the discussion has subsided, at least for the time being. In the wake
of the economic crisis (during which many countries were desperate for employment-creating FDI, re-
gardless of its origin and the form it took), the discussions about sovereign wealth funds (including
China’s) entering the world FDI market (although not in a substantial manner)—which reached its cli-
max just before the onset of the crisis and had led to the adoption (under the aegis of the IMF) of the
2008 ‘Santiago Principles’ (International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth
Funds Generally Accepted Principles and Practices ‘Santiago Principles’, available at http://www.iwg-swf.
org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (last visited 25 July 2014))—have died down. It remains to be
seen, however, whether, with the economic performance of countries recovering, FDI by sovereign
wealth funds will receive renewed critical public attention.
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investors [that were] not so good, not so satisfactory’.109 As China’s outward FDI
grows, it may well be that scepticism toward such investment will grow as well in
some circles.
F. Implications for China’s national outward FDI policy
So the obvious question is: what could be done to deal with the reaction to China’s
outward FDI to avoid a backlash and build trust? (There is of course also the chal-
lenge for host countries, and especially developed ones, to accommodate the rise of
China’s outward FDI and respect that country’s interests.)
At the national level, SOEs—as the main outward investors—have a special re-
sponsibility to make sure that their investments abroad are well planned, prepared,
and received. This is particularly important when investments take the form of
M&As and are in industries that are sensitive (e.g., for national security of cultural
reasons) or involve iconic targets. (Even M&As in other areas may elicit concerns, as
they are frequently associated with restructuring and the shedding of jobs.) Hence,
governments at all levels need to be carefully prepared, and the benefits of a particu-
lar acquisition need to be spelled out. Moreover, once established, SOEs need to
make an extra effort to become ‘insiders’, i.e., good corporate citizens that are recog-
nized as such. This can be achieved, for example, through sourcing from local sup-
pliers, by employing nationals in high corporate positions, becoming members of
local associations, and engaging in various corporate social responsibility (CSR)
activities. In fact, SOE affiliates in host countries could commit themselves to dedi-
cate a small percentage of their earnings to CSR activities in their host countries110
and to support the initiative of the Group of 7111 to establish a global facility that
helps developing countries (and especially the least developed among them) negoti-
ate large scale contracts with MNEs to ensure that both host countries and investors
benefit equitably from the investments made, especially in natural resources.
But China’s government also has a role to play. For example, it could pay more at-
tention to enforcing the various instruments that it has already in place to guide the
behavior of its foreign investors abroad. More ambitiously, China could complement
its ‘going-out’ strategy with a ‘going-in’ strategy.112 Such a strategy would seek to
maximize not only the benefits of the country’s outward FDI for China (and its
109 Javier Blas, China’s central bank chief admits difficulties with Africa, Financial Times (22 May 2014, 6:13
PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b212302-e1c9-11e3-b7c4-00144feabdc0.html#axz
z3EolVbxrE (quoting the governor).
110 A variation of what India’s Companies Act 2013 mandates for corporate responsibility spending by its
own firms in India. See The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, India Code, available at http://indiacode.
nic.in/acts-in-pdf/182013.pdf.
111 The Group of 7, in its June 2014 Summit, announced ‘a new initiative on Strengthening Assistance for
Complex Contract Negotiations (CONNEX) to provide developing country partners with extended
and concrete expertise for negotiating complex commercial contracts, focusing initially on the extractives
sector . . . .’ See Memorandum, The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, European Commission - MEMO/
14/402 05/06/2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-402_en.htm. Part of
this initiative is a Knowledge Portal, developed by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
available at www.negotiationsupport.org, last accessed on 25 July 2014, and launched 17 June 2014.
112 For a brief elaboration of such a strategy, see Karl P. Sauvant and Victor Z. Chen, ‘China Needs to
Complement its “going-out” Policy with a “going-in” Strategy’, 121 Column FDI Perspectives,(12 May
2014), available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/publications/columbia-fdi-perspectives/.
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firms), but also for the economic, social, and environmental development of the host
countries in which Chinese firms invest, and takes place in fair governance mechan-
isms—in short, a strategy for sustainable FDI. Key elements of such a ‘going-in’ strat-
egy could be to reinforce China’s current regulatory framework dealing with the
behavior of Chinese MNEs abroad, to expand it (e.g., in line with the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to which China could adhere) and better
to monitor and enforce the country’s regulatory framework guiding the behavior of
its firms abroad (including by linking access to various home country measures re-
garding outward FDI to the observance of certain requirements). Such a strategy
could be underpinned by requiring, by law, that Chinese SOEs (and, for that matter,
other outward investors) dedicate a small percentage of their earnings to CSR activ-
ities in host countries. The government itself could furthermore support the earlier
mentioned initiative of the Group of 7 to establish a negotiations support facility.
A ‘going-in’ strategy by China along these lines could become a model for other
home countries, whether they are developed or developing. Conceivably, it could also
influence the content of international investment agreements and give home country
governments a role in ensuring that the outward investment by firms headquartered in
their territories has as much as possible the characteristics of sustainable FDI.
Beyond that, and most importantly in the context of this article, the mixed per-
ception and reception of China’s OFDI in important host countries for its MNEs
strengthens China’s interest in international investment agreements that protect the
country’s outward FDI (especially against discriminatory treatment of its investors,
including SOEs) and that help to secure access to markets. (Considerations of this
type may well be one of the principal driving forces behind China’s interest to con-
clude BITs with the USA and the European Union, the world’s biggest markets, as
well as other important host countries.) At the same time, China would want to pro-
tect its ‘going out’ strategy and the various instruments it has put in place in the con-
text of this strategy.
Thus, China’s interests have changed profoundly since it entered to world FDI
market in a substantial manner more than a decade ago. Accordingly, the country’s
approach to international investment agreements has changed, and can be expected
to evolve further—a topic that is being considered next.
I I I . CHINA’S CHANGING APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
As mentioned earlier, China has signed more BITs than any other country except
Germany.113 China also has in place other IIAs, including free trade agreements
(FTAs) containing investment chapters (ASEAN, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, and Switzerland) and a trilateral agreement with
Japan and the Republic of Korea.114 China’s IIA program, which was initiated in
113 As of December 2014, Germany had concluded 134 BITs and China 130. See http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited 17 December 2014).
114 See China FTA Network, MOFCOM, available as http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml (last
visited 30 September 2014). China is also currently negotiating FTAs with the Gulf Cooperation
Council, Australia, Norway, and Japan/Republic of Korea.
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1982, has undergone a major shift in focus during the past approximately 15 years.
This shift corresponds to the evolution of China’s policy respecting foreign invest-
ment. Indeed, as China has gradually become a capital-exporting nation, it became
necessary for it to ensure protection of Chinese interests abroad.
A. China’s evolving investment treaty program reflects an
increasing engagement in ISDS
After decades of isolation, China opened up to foreign investment in around
1980.115 The first BIT that China entered into was with Sweden in 1982, and
China’s focus for the major part of the 1980s was clearly on inward investment.
During this period, most of China’s BITs were concluded with European countries.
It was only in the 1990s that China’s investment treaty endeavors gained signifi-
cance.116 Between 1988 and 1998, more than 60 BITs were signed, the majority of
which were with developing countries.
This first generation of China’s BITs, concluded between 1982 and 1998, is marked
by the restrictive approach taken with respect to both substantive protections, such as
national treatment, and investor-state dispute resolution. Indeed, arbitrability of dis-
putes arising under these investment treaties is arguably limited.117 China was then a
predominantly capital-importing country, and it had little incentive to place its trust in
a dispute resolution mechanism in which its sovereignty could be impinged. The dis-
pute resolution clauses in these first BITs exhibited language to the effect that only
‘disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation’118 or ‘disputes
involving the amount of compensation for expropriation’ could be arbitrated.119 As a
result, disputes arising out of a first-generation treaty should arguably be limited to the
very narrow question of quantum where a foreign investor was dispossessed of its in-
vestment.120 In most BITs entered during this period, China’s so-limited consent was
to arbitration by ad hoc tribunals under the UNCITRAL Rules.
In keeping with the limited nature of its consent to arbitrate disputes with foreign
investors, China qualified its ratification of the ICSID Convention in 1993 by stating
that ‘the Chinese Government would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes for disputes over
compensation resulting from expropriation and nationalization’.121
115 See Stephan W. Schill, ‘Tearing Down the Great Wall’, 15 Cardozo Journal of International and
Competitive Law 73 (2007), at 77–80.
116 See Congyan Cai, ‘Outward Foreign Direct Investment Protection and the Effectiveness of Chinese BIT
Practice’, 7 Journal of World Investment and Trade 621ff. (2006).
117 See e.g., Peter J. Turner and Mark Mangan, ‘China’s Investment Treaties: Substantive and Procedural
Rights’, 5 Asian Counsel 43(2007) (‘Typically the right to arbitration was restricted under these BITs to
the amount of compensation payable on expropriation (but not the initial question of whether an expro-
priation had taken place’); see also Schill, above 115, at 89–91.
118 See, e.g., China–U.K. BIT.
119 See, e.g., China–Mongolia BIT, Art. 8(3).
120 It should be noted here that some tribunals have taken the view that a dispute over the amount of com-
pensation should be construed as encompassing the very existence of an expropriation. See below
Section IIIB.
121 See China’s Notification, dated 7 January 1993, available at icsid.worldbank.org. This notification was
never repealed, despite China’s broad adherence to the concept of investment dispute settlement
through arbitration in later iterations of IIAs. This notification, however, does not prevent arbitrating
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In its second generation of BITs, starting with its agreement with Barbados in
1998, China considerably broadened its consent to arbitration for disputes with for-
eign investors. The majority of treaties concluded between 1998 and 2008 vested ar-
bitral tribunals—either under the auspices of ICSID or ad hoc/UNCITRAL—with
the competence to hear ‘any disputes concerning an investment’.122 The broadening
of China’s consent to arbitration in the second generation of its BITs at the turn of
the century coincided with an impending announcement of the country’s ‘going out’
strategy in 2001 and the subsequent rise in outward investment, from around US$2
billion in 1999 to US$116 billion in 2014.123
As China’s outbound FDI has increased over the past decade, so too has its re-
solve to protect Chinese interests abroad. The third generation of China IIAs
embodies distinctive features showing a seemingly more careful approach to treaty
protection with, on the one hand, a tightening of the admissibility of investors’ claims
and, on the other hand, an increased level of substantive protections afforded to in-
vestors, including SOEs. China’s new tailored approach seems to reflect a balancing
act. It ensures that its SOE-focused investment program is protected while the pro-
tections afforded to foreign investors are on par with current international standards
but nonetheless allow sufficient flexibility for China to exercise its sovereign police
powers.
1. Restrictions in China IIAs to admissibility of investor claims
(i) ‘Investors’. The IIAs that China recently has entered into use language requiring
not only that the incorporation or seat of a foreign investor to be in the contracting
state, as was the case in previous iterations, but also that a foreign investor have ‘real
economic activities’124 or be ‘engaged in substantive business operations’125 in the
territory of the contracting state. Some other treaties refer to the requirement that
the foreign investor, if a corporate entity, must be controlled by nationals of the con-
tracting state to be entitled to treaty protection.126 These requirements are some-
times coupled with an affirmative ‘denial of benefits’ clause which, as the name
suggests, denies to foreign investors the benefit of investment treaty protection when
disputes that would be subjected to IIAs of second or third generation. Indeed, ‘a notification under Art.
25(4) does not stand in the way of consent’. See Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A
Commentary (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 930. That is because, as the
World Bank’s Executive Directors’ Committee expressed in the ICSID Report No. 29 dealing with Art.
25(4) of the ICSID Convention, ‘a statement by a Contracting State that it would consider submitting a
certain class of dispute to the Centre would serve for purposes of information only and would not con-
stitute the consent required to give the Centre jurisdiction. Of course, a statement excluding certain
classes of disputes from consideration ould not constitute a reservation to the Convention.’ ibid. at 923–
935.
122 See, e.g., 1999 China–Barbados BIT. This BIT, however, subjected arbitration of the dispute to exhaus-
tion of ‘local administrative review procedure’ at the state’s election. See Art. 9(3). In the subsequent
2003 China–Germany BIT, no such exhaustion of remedies provision was inserted in the arbitration
clause (Art. 9), although the BIT’s Protocol provided that an administrative review procedure must be
initiated by the investor and that ‘the dispute still exists three months after [the investor] has brought
the issue to the review procedure’.
123 See above n 3.
124 China–Romania BIT, Art. 2(b).
125 China–Mexico BIT, Art. 1(b).
126 See, e.g., China–Peru FTA, Art. 126.
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certain requirements such as control by a national of the contracting state or substan-
tive business activities in the contracting state are not satisfied.127
Importantly, Chinese SOEs are now included as falling within the ambit of bilat-
eral treaty protections. Indeed, in recent Chinese IIAs, ‘public institutions’128 or ‘gov-
ernmentally owned or controlled’129 investors are protected. This language
presumably follows the example of NAFTA or the 2004 US Model BIT.130 Other
countries have expressly referred to their government in the definition of ‘investor’,
including Saudi Arabia,131 Qatar,132 and the United Arab Emirates.133
As seen above, SOEs are crucial to China’s outward FDI as they account for be-
tween 2/3 and 3/4 of total FDI.134 As is the case in the vast majority of IIAs,135
China had not expressly included state entities in the scope of protected investors in
previous iterations of IIAs. Although older IIAs did not expressly include SOEs
within their purview, one may wonder whether investment treaty’s protections
should be extended or denied to an SOE thereunder. This question is all the more
important as China has historically operated exceedingly heavily through SOEs.136
127 ibid., Art. 137.
128 See, e.g., China–Korea BIT, Art 1(2)(b).
129 China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 11; China–Mexico BIT, Art. 1; China–ASEAN FTA, Art. 1(f); China–
Japan–Republic of Korea TIT, Art. 1(4).
130 The 2004 US Model BIT defines ‘investor of a Party’ as ‘a Party or state enterprise thereof, . . . that at-
tempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party’. This language
is almost identical to that of NAFTA Art. 1139 (‘investor of a non-Party means an investor other than
an investor of a Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment’). Other IIAs take a simi-
lar approach, namely the Canada Model BIT Art. 1, U.S.–Australia FTA Art. 1.2, U.S.–Singapore FTA
Art. 1.2, Canada–Chile FTA Art. 1(2) and Japan–Mexico FTA Art. 2.
131 E.g., Saudi Arabia–Belgium–Luxembourg BIT, Art. 1(3): ‘the term “investor” means: (a) in respect of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: . . . III – the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its finan-
cial institutions and authorities such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, public funds and other simi-
lar governmental institutions existing in Saudi Arabia’; Saudi Arabia–Italy BIT, Art. 1(3)(a)(iii): ‘Con il
termine “investitore” si intende . . . il governo del Regno dell’Arabia Saudita e le sue istituzioni ed autor-
ita` finanziarie quali la Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, i fondi pubblici ed altre istituzioni governative
analoghe esistenti in Arabia Saudita”; Saudi Arabia-France BIT, Art. 1(2): “Le terme d’"investisseur “
de´signe . . . l’une ou l’autre des Parties contractantes et ses institutions et autorite´s financie`res, fonds
publics et autres institutions gouvernementales analogues’.
132 Qatar–Germany BIT, Art. 1(3)(b)(3): ‘The term “investors” means: . . . in respect of the State of
Qatar: . . . (c) the Government of the State of Qatar.’ The same language was used in other Qatar
BITs, such as the Qatar–Republic of Korea BIT, Art. 1(3)(b); Qatar–Switzerland BIT, Art. 1(1)(c) and
Qatar–China BIT, Art. 1(2).
133 UAE–China BIT, Art. 1(2)(b): ‘The term “investor” shall mean for the United Arab Emirates (1) the
Federal Government of the U.A.E.’ and Art. 1(2)(b)(2): ‘the Local Governments and their local and fi-
nancial institutions.’; UAE–Austria BIT, Art. 1(1)(c); UAE–Finland BIT, Art. 1(4)(a); UAE–France
BIT, Art. 1(2); UAE–Switzerland BIT, Art. 1(1)(b)(iii); UAE–United Kingdom BIT, Art. 1(e).
134 See above Section I.
135 See Jo En Low, ‘The Status of State-Controlled Entities under International Investment Agreements’, in
Andrea Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (Oxford University Press,
New York 2014) 2012–2013, 543.
136 It was reported that, by 2010, there were 26,319 ‘centrally controlled non-financial SOEs’ in China, ac-
counting for 10% of China’s GDP. Sixty six of these SOEs made the 2012 Fortune Global 500 list. See
Duanjie Chen, China’s State-owned enterprises: how much do we know? From CNOOC to its siblings,
University of Calgary SPP Research Paper No. 6-19 (June 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2277938.
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One author emphasized that ‘if an [SOE] is established as required under the law
of a contracting party, it [therefore] qualifies as an “investor” ’ such that it is not
excluded from the scope of investment protections.137 Another commentator sug-
gested that ‘exclusion of State entities from coverage would leave the investment
treaty with no meaningful application’ for BITs concluded with communist states.138
On the other hand, SOEs, as state owned, presumably have greater access to state
support when investments are distressed than ‘private’ BIT claimants may have.
Therefore, their access to investor-state arbitration seems less justifiable per se, ab-
sent express language to that effect, especially if one considers the concept of com-
petitive neutrality that mandates maintaining a level-playing field between SOEs and
private businesses.139
In a landmark arbitration award, the arbitral tribunal took the position that pro-
tections should be extended where the SOE is not ‘performing State functions’.140
This view corresponds to the traditional dichotomy ‘acta jure gestionis’—i.e., where
the country acts in a commercial capacity—versus ‘acta jure imperii’—i.e., where the
state acts as a sovereign (and is thus protected by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity).141
The drafting history of the ICSID Convention is enlightening in that respect.
Indeed, the travaux pre´paratoires reflect that the drafters debated, and ultimately re-
jected, the possibility that investor-states could appear in ICSID proceedings.142 On
the other hand, they considered that an SOE ‘ “should not be disqualified as a “na-
tional of another Contracting State” unless it is acting as an agent for the government
or is discharging an essentially governmental function” ’.143 Indeed, the purpose of
the ICSID Convention was to ‘stimulat[e] a larger flow of private international
137 Jo En Low, above n 135, at 547.
138 Claudia Annacker, ‘Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under Investment Treaties’,
10(3) Chinese Journal of International Law 531(2011), available at http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/
content/10/3/531.short.
139 See aboveSections I and II. Although investor-state arbitration is meant to establish equality of arms
where the relationship between parties is by nature imbalanced, it might be argued that providing the
benefit of investor protection to an entity that already benefits from state protections would unduly tip
the balance.
140 CSOB v Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, paras
23–27.
141 This is also known as the ‘Broches test’, a reference to ICSID’s founding father Aron Broches. See below
n 143. An example is Rumeli v Kazakhstan in which the tribunal stated that ‘a state-owned entity quali-
fies as a national of another Contracting State unless it acts as an agent for the government or discharges
an essentially governmental function’. See also Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon
Hizmetleri AS v Republic of Kazakhstan,ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, para 211. See
also Walid Ben Hamida, ‘Sovereign FDI and International Investment Agreements: Questions Relating
to the Qualification of Sovereign Entities and the Admission of their Investments under Investment
Agreements’, 9 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 22 (2010). See also Annacker,
above n 138.
142 See History of the ICSID Convention, Washington: World Bank, 2006 vol. II-1, 401, 976–979, 1018
(2006).
143 Aron Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States’, 136 RdC 331, (1972) 355.
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investment’144 which arguably bars access to arbitration to ‘nationals’ whose invest-
ment reflects only governmental concerns.145
An UNCTAD report stated on that topic that ‘[t]he question whether State-
owned or controlled enterprises are covered by an investment agreement has to be
treated differently from the question whether States parties to the agreement them-
selves can act as investors. Usually, State enterprises are covered even if not explicitly
stated while States themselves tend not to be unless this is expressly provided for.’146
Yet, it bears noting that China’s SOEs, in contrast with some other SOEs and pri-
vately owned companies, have been said often not to have financial performance at
heart—as evidenced by their profitability ratios147—but rather may be animated by
strategic state-related considerations. Indeed, to further China’s industrial policy
‘aimed at leapfrogging global economic powers’, China is said to be ‘going out’
through some of its SOEs in an effort to have access to foreign resources.148 In the
context of access investor-state arbitration, it is legitimate to wonder whether SOEs,
to the extent that their impetus is the same as that of the state, should qualify under
IIA regimes absent an express agreement to that effect in the applicable IIA. To ad-
dress this question with respect to China, further clarification is required on a case-
by-case basis as to whether Chinese SOEs constitute instrumentalities of the Chinese
central government.
(ii) ‘Investments’. For most of its BIT history, China has considered that ‘every kind
of asset’ qualified as investments.149 It appears that in its most recent treaties, China
is departing from this approach. China, following the example of countries such as
the USA, now specifically excludes certain business transactions from the definition
of qualified investments. So far, China has excluded certain types of loans and
debts.150 China has also excluded claims to money arising out of commercial con-
tracts for sale of goods and services, or out of extensions of credit in connection with
contracts for sale of goods and services.151 By so doing, China effectively denies the
benefit of investor-state arbitration to these categories of investments.
Furthermore, to qualify as an ‘investment’ under China’s BITs, an economic in-
vestment must be made ‘in accordance with the laws’ of the host state.152 Depending
upon the specific formulation used in a particular treaty, failure to abide by the
144 Barton Legum and William Kirtley, ‘The Status of the Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID
Convention’, 27(1) ICSID Review (2012) paras 12–13.
145 Caution should be exercised, however, as the distinction between private and public capital is often arti-
ficial, considering the frequently hybrid nature of the pooling of funds in a transnational investment.
Determining jurisdiction on the basis of the source of capital alone seems outmoded and impractical.
See Jo En Low, above n 135, at 558–559.
146 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, 142 n 12 (2004). For a recent discussion, see
Jo En Low, above n 135.
147 Chen, above n 136, at Table 6. The author observes that if we take account of the advantages that SOEs
enjoy such as free use of land and natural resources, the numbers plummet even more. Ibid., at 6.
148 ibid., at 12.
149 See, e.g., 1985 China–France BIT, Art. 1(1): ‘Le terme « investissement » de´signe des avoirs de toute
nature’. These clauses would generally include a non-exhaustive list of categories of such investments.
150 China–Mexico BIT, Art. 1(c) and (d); China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 135 and China–Peru, Art. 126.
151 China–Mexico BIT, Art. 1(h).
152 See, e.g., 1982 China–Sweden BIT, Art. 1.
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domestic law of the host country may be interpreted as excluding protection under a
treaty.153
(iii) Umbrella clause. The so-called ‘umbrella clauses’, also known as ‘observance of
undertakings’ clauses, may allow investors to claim that a breach of a contractual
undertaking arising out of an associated contract between the foreign investor and
the state constitutes a treaty violation.154 Umbrella clauses were a hallmark of the se-
cond generation of China’s BITs, with some of these treaties imposing on a contract-
ing state the observance of ‘any commitments it may have entered into with the
investors’155 or ‘any contractual obligation it may have entered into towards an
investor’.156
As many a claimant has attempted to elevate contract breaches to international
treaty violations through ‘umbrella clauses’, recent IIAs have generally abandoned
this type of provision. China, following the example of the USA and others, has
revised its second-generation model dispute settlement clause to narrow its consent
to arbitration in the current generation of Chinese IIAs. Arbitration is now restricted
to only ‘disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other
Contracting Party arising from an alleged breach of [a treaty] obligation’.157
153 ‘In accordance with the law’ provisions are generally contained as part of the definition of investments
or within the provisions dedicated to admission and protection of an investment. Should the investment
contravene the domestic laws of the host state, tribunals can deny jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fakes v Republic
of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, July 14, 2010, para 115; Inceysa Vallisoletana v Republic
of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, para 195; Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para 204. Not all violations qualify as an exclusion, however, such as minor
breaches of bureaucratic formalities. See Tokios Tokele´s v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award,
26 July 2007, para 97. It should also be noted that even when no ‘in accordance with the law’ provision
was included in the IIA, some tribunals found that such an obligation is implicit. See Plama Consortium
Ltd v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008. For general developments on ‘in
accordance with the law’, see Rudolph Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International
Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 92, 13492, 134-139 139. See also Rahim Moloo and
Alex Khachaturian, ‘The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International Investment Law’,
34(6) Fordham International Law Journal (2011). See also Stephan W. Schill, Illegal investments in
international arbitration, SSRN (4 January 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1979734.
154 See, e.g., SGS Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/
6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004; Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and
Italstrade S.p.A. v Morocco, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Award, 23 July 2001. See also
Gaillard, Investment treaty arbitration and jurisdiction over contract claims—the SGS cases considered, in
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties
and Customary International Law 325 (Cameron & May eds., 2005). Some tribunals, however, denied
such an effect to umbrella clauses. See, e.g., SGS Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003; and Joy Mining Machinery
Limited v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction dated 30 July 2004. For a compre-
hensive analysis of the scope of umbrella clauses. See Laura Hanonen, ‘Containing the Scope of the
Umbrella Clause’, 1 Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law 27(T.J. Grierson Weiler, ed.
2008).
155 E.g., 2001 China–Netherlands BIT, Art. 3(4).
156 E.g., 2001 China–Jordan BIT, Art. 9(2).
157 See, e.g., 2008 China–Mexico BIT, Art. 11ff.
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(iv) Non-precluded measures. Recent IIAs concluded by China invariably contain the
so-called ‘non-precluded measures’ (NPM) clauses. Such clauses allow states to dero-
gate from the duties they would otherwise be compelled to abide, provided certain
circumstances occur. The most common such derogation pertains to measures taken
by the state in the interest of security under specific circumstances.158 Other possible
NPMs are prudential measures ‘to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
system’159 or taxation measures.160 Often, IIAs that include a NPM clause state that
the clause is self-judging, meaning that whether the measure comports with the
scope of the clause is a matter for the judgment of the state taking the measure.161
The NPM mechanism calls for some observations in relation with the concept of
indirect expropriation. International arbitral tribunals have uniformly recognized the
principle that expropriation could be indirect, or creeping162, through adoption by
the host state of ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’,163 such as regulatory or le-
gislative orders effectively depriving the investor from the enjoyment of its invest-
ment.164 Through NPMs—the most notable of which arguably being taxation
measures—a state can effectively carve out measures that could otherwise be deemed
expropriatory such that it be shielded from liability for the use of its regalian powers.
In that respect, recent treaties executed by China contain annexes making clear that
‘deprivation of property [through] measures taken in the exercise of a state’s regula-
tory powers as may be reasonably justified in the protection of the public wel-
fare . . . shall not constitute an indirect expropriation’.165 Because such measures
having the effect of depriving an investor of its property should be ‘reasonably
justified’, however, they are not self-judging, contrary to standard non-precluded
measures.
(v) Administrative review. As it moved toward its second generation of IIAs, seem-
ingly in anticipation of its ‘going out’ strategy, China adopted the Administrative
158 E.g., China New–Zealand FTA, Art. 201; China–Peru FTA, Art. 194.
159 E.g., China New–Zealand FTA, Art. 203; China–Peru FTA, Art. 197.
160 E.g., China New–Zealand FTA, Art. 204.
161 Language typically used refers to measures ‘deemed necessary’ or ‘that [the host state] considers neces-
sary’. A claim deemed precluded by the state should nevertheless be subject to a balancing test, upon re-
view by an arbitral tribunal as to its admissibility rationae materiae. See Michael D. Nolan and Fre´de´ric
G. Sourgens, ‘The Limits of Discretion? Self-judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment
Agreements’, in Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy (2012) 2010–2011,
362ff.
162 See Compan˜ı´a del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1,
Award of the Tribunal (17 February 2000). See also Generation Ukraine Inc. v Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/9, Award, para 20.22 (16 September 2003).
163 See, e.g., SD Myers v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA, First Partial Award, (13 November 2000), para 285.
164 See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Interim Award (26 June 2000),
para 306. See also L. Yves Fortier and Stephen L. Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of
International Investment: I Know it When I See it, or Caveat Investor’, 13 Asia Pacific Law Review 79
(2005), 81.
165 China–New Zealand FTA, Annex 13; China–Peru FTA, Annex 9. See also 2006 China–India BIT,
Protocol, III Ad Art. 5(3): ‘non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted by a Contracting Party in
pursuit of public interest, including measures pursuant to awards of general application rendered by judi-
cial bodies do not constitute indirect expropriation or nationalization’.
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Reconsideration Law in 1999.166 Concomitantly, China inserted provisions into its
BITs establishing a two-step mechanism for investment disputes, presumably be-
cause second-generation IIAs provided that any such disputes could be arbitrated.
These disputes ought to be submitted to administrative review under Chinese sub-
stantive law within 60 days from the date the investor was notified of the aggrieving
act.167 The administration then disposes of the same time limit of 60 days to render
its decision. It is only after expiry of these successive time limits that resorting to ar-
bitration becomes permissible.168 Pursuant to Article 6 of that Administrative
Reconsideration Law, the Chinese administration is vested with the exclusive powers
to review, inter alia:
administrative penalties such as . . . confiscation of illegal gains, confiscation of
unlawful property or things of value, order for suspension of production or busi-
ness operation, temporary suspension or rescission of permit, temporary suspen-
sion or rescission of license . . . freezing of property . . . suspension or revocation
of such documents as permits, licenses and qualification certificates . . . right of
ownership in or the right to the use of natural resources . . . .”
A commentator has observed that prior recourse to administrative reconsideration
should not be warranted if the state act complained of is a court order or piece of le-
gislation, as opposed to an action of an administrative nature.169
2. Enhanced substantive protections in recent Chinese BITs
(i) Fair and equitable treatment. The obligation that foreign investments be afforded
fair and equitable treatment (FET) was accounted for as early as the 1982 China–
Sweden BIT.170 With a few exceptions,171 all Chinese BITs contain a FET clause. A
notable distinction exists, however, in that third generation of Chinese BITs subject
the FET standard to customary international law.172 Just like many BITs from other
nations,173 the language of China’s second-generation BITs generally referred to
FET ‘in accordance with International Law’174 or ‘conforme´ment aux principes du
Droit international’175 This language coupled with a broad arbitration clause (‘any in-
vestment dispute’) arguably exposed China to broad liability. This is because the
166 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Reconsideration (29 April 1999), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan048297.pdf.
167 ibid., at Art. 9.
168 See, e.g., China–Germany BIT, Protocol 6 (Ad Art. 9).
169 See Wang Guiguo, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement in China’, Transnational Dispute Management 5
(2011), at 4, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key¼1764.
170 China–Sweden BIT, Art. 1(1).
171 1988 China–Japan BIT; 1990 China–Turkey BIT.
172 For an analysis of FET standard encompassing customary international law principles, see Dolzer, above
n 153, at 134–139.
173 E.g., France IIAs’ FET clauses (‘Chacune des Parties contractantes s’engage a` assurer, sur son territoire
et dans sa zone maritime, un traitement juste et e´quitable, conforme´ment aux principes du droit
international’).
174 2007 China–Costa Rica BIT.
175 2005 China–Madagascar BIT.
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vague reference to international law presumably gives extensive latitude to an arbitral
tribunal to interpret the applicable FET standard without necessarily resorting to opi-
nio juris sive necessitates (general practice accepted as law).176 This, among other rea-
sons, may have prompted change in China’s recent investment treaties, in which the
language historically used is replaced by clauses providing for fair and equitable treat-
ment ‘in accordance with commonly accepted rules of international law’177 or ‘in ac-
cordance with customary international law’,178 which presumably leaves less room
for interpretation as the concept of ‘customary international law’ commonly refers to
‘established state practice’.179 This change was reported as an example of NAFTA’s
influence on China’s drafting of its third-generation IIAs.180
(ii) Most-favored-nation treatment. It was the regular practice of drafters of China’s
BITs, even in the early days, to include a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause grant-
ing investments subject to a BIT containing an MFN the same prerogatives and ad-
vantages (or some subset of them) offered to investors under other BITs concluded
by China.181 MFN clauses foster equality in the competitive environment among for-
eign investors.182 Although the content of the MFN clause itself has not substantially
varied through the BIT generations, its import does: it has ‘considerable weight since
her [sic]new generation investment grant broader protection to foreign investors’.183
Thus, an investor with an investment subject to the protections of a first-generation
BIT may attempt to invoke enhanced protections of a second or third-generation
BIT.184
(iii) National treatment. In the first generation of its BITs, China refused to grant
national Treatment (NT) to foreign investors that is equal treatment to that af-
forded to its own citizens, or did so only on a best effort basis.185 China’s original
reluctance was said to be caused by the lack of strength of its nascent economy vis-a`-
vis international actors,186 or to uphold ‘structures of a socialist planning
176 See generally James Crawford, Browlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press,
2013) 25.
177 2008 China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 143(1).
178 2009 China–Peru FTA, Art. 132.
179 See, Definition of Customary International Law, Legal Information Institute, available at http://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law. See also, International Court of Justice, Case concern-
ing the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, para 27 (‘It is of
course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the ac-
tual practice and opinio juris of States’).
180 See Axel Berger, ‘Investment Rules in Chinese PTIAs – Partial “NAFTA-ization” ’, in R. Hofmann, S.
Schill and C. Tams (eds.), Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: From Recalibration to
Reintegration (2013).
181 See, Rainer Hofmann; Stephan Schill; Christian J. Tams e.g., China–Sweden BIT, Art. 2(2) (subject to con-
ditions of Art. 2(3) regarding customs union or FTA).
182 Schill, above n 115, at 100.
183 ibid.
184 See below Section IIIB for a summary analysis of applicability of MFN treatment to IIA arbitration
clauses.
185 See, e.g., China–UK BIT, Art. 3(3) which uses the language ‘to the extent possible’.
186 Armand De Mestral and Ce´line Le´vesque, Improving International Investment Agreements (Routledge,
2013) 65.
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economy’.187 Yet, national treatment is a ‘core guarantee’ of investment treaty prac-
tice for instilling a sense of fairness in competition between foreign and local
actors.188 China shifted gears in its recent treaties. With China’s accession to market
economy prominence, and notable accession to the WTO regime, which imposes
non discrimination and national treatment as core principles,189 NT clauses are now
routinely inserted, albeit with a (significant) caveat: the NT clause contains either
the qualification ‘without prejudice to its laws and regulations’190, or a so-called
‘grandfather clause’, exempts the state from foreign investors’ claims of discrimin-
ation on the basis of pre-existing law.191
An important development occurred during the on-going negotiations between
China and the USA for the conclusion of a BIT. As reported above, China conceded
in July of 2013 to granting national treatment at the pre-establishment stage of an in-
vestment.192 Not only that, but China has also agreed to switch from a positive list
system—where allowed investments are exhaustively enumerated—to a negative list
system—where only the sectors where foreign investment is prohibited are listed,
the rest being libera terra. This change may well signal China’s willingness to further
adapt to the standards adopted by other countries and engage in a fourth generation
of IIAs.193
China had used a positive list for decades, notably pursuant to its Catalogue of
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (‘Catalogue’), delineating the sectors
where foreign investment was encouraged, allowed, and prohibited.194 This positive
list system was coupled with a post-establishment—meaning only after approval by
the Chinese administration—national treatment protection.
The major change from positive to negative list was meant to ‘help establish a
level playing ground for market players . . . as two way trade and investment have
continued to expand’.195 China’s remarks underline a potential greater adherence to
international standards of protection for investors, presumably prompted by a desire
to safeguard its interest abroad. But even if China decides to adopt pre-establishment
national treatment in a more systematic way,196 the contours of such protections are
unclear and, depending on the content of the negative list, they could very well be
187 Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations – A Critical Appraisal, (2005)
163ff.
188 Schill, above n 115, at 94.
189 ibid., at 99.
190 See China Model BIT, Art. 3.2. This type of clause would not frustrate challenges to administrative acts.
191 See, e.g., China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 138: ‘[NT] does not apply to (a) any existing non-conforming
measures maintained within its territory; (b) the continuation [thereof]’.
192 See Paxton, above n 49; Pheakdey, above n 50.
193 One could envision that such a fourth generation of IIAs may well encompass environmental consider-
ations, modern transparency standards, and workforce protection, see below Section IV.
194 See Nie Pingxiang, Negative list in need of some positive tweaks, China Daily Asia (19 May 2014), avail-
able at http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2014-05/19/content_15135843.html.
195 MOC: China using global approach in investment talks with U.S., Xinhua (12 July 2013), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8323785.html.
196 China is currently experimenting the pre-establishment negative list system in its Shanghai Free Trade
Zone since 30 September 2013 and in Pingtan Island since 3 June 2014. See Luo Liexin, China’s second
negative list a move forward, China Daily (4 June 2014), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2014-06/04/content_17563011.htm.
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hampered in practice. Indeed, one could imagine a list as extensive as to defeat its
purpose.197 In that respect, it is worth noting that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone’s
pilot program which implements a negative list system reportedly has had a mere
27% reduction in its foreign investment restrictions.198
(iv) Full protection and security. Initially, Chinese BITs flatly affirmed that foreign in-
vestment ‘shall enjoy protection’.199 It is unclear whether this language was intended
to cover less than the largely internationally recognized standard of full protection
and security (FPS), but China has used more expansive language in recent treaties
such as ‘constant protection and security’,200 ‘full protection’,201 or ‘full protection
and security’.202 The standard implies an ‘obligation of vigilance’203 from the part of
the host state, with ‘the mere lack or want of [its] diligence’ sufficing to constitute a
breach.204 There is no consensus as to whether FPS clauses should be understood as
limited to physical protection of the investment by the host state205 or as also ex-
tending to circumstances not involving physical violence or damage.206
In an interpretive exercise, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission tied FPS clauses
with protections not to exceed customary international law standards.207 This ap-
proach found some supporters in investment arbitration208 and seemed to have been
endorsed recently by China. Indeed, in its recent treaties, China circumscribes the
FPS clause with ‘commonly accepted rules of international law’,209 ‘international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens’,210 or ‘customary international law’.211
In sum, it seems clear, upon review of the Chinese IIAs entered into since the
early 1980s, that China’s perspective on investment protection has dramatically
changed as it has increasingly engaged into outbound investment activities, mainly
197 It seems that the approach taken thus far is to make a mirror-image of the former positive lists of the
Catalogue in the first iteration of its negative list. See Pingxiang, above n 191.
198 See Matthew Zito, Camille Chen and Rainy Yao, Shanghai FTZ revised negative list introduces targeted
FDI reforms, China Briefing (3 July 2014), available at http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2014/07/
03/shanghai-ftz-revised-negative-list-introduces-targeted-fdi-reforms.html.
199 See, e.g., China–Croatia BIT, Art. 3(1); China–Ethiopia BIT, Art. 3(1).
200 See, e.g., 2005 China–Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, Art. 2(3)
201 See, e.g., 2006 China–Russian Federation BIT, Art. 2(2).
202 See, e.g., 2005 China–Czech Republic BIT, Art. 2(2).
203 American Manufacturing & Trading Inc. v Zaı¨re, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (1997), para 6.05.
204 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (1990), para
77.
205 See, e.g., Rumeli v Kazhakstan, above n 80, at para 668; Saluka Investments v Czech Republic, above n 153,
at paras 483–484; BG Group PLC v Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL Final Award, 24 December 2007,
para 324; Wena Hotels v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Annulment Proceeding Decision, 5
February 2002, para 84.
206 CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para 613; Azurix v Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 14 July 2006,para¶ 406; Vivendi v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award (2007), para 7.4.12; Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July
2008, para 729.
207 See Mahnaz Malik, The full protection and security standard comes of age: yet another challenge for
states in investment treaty arbitration?, IISD Paper (November 2011), at 9.
208 See, e.g., Noble v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (2005), para 164.
209 China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 143.
210 China–Mexico BIT, Art. 5.
211 China–Peru FTA, Art. 132.
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through its SOEs, over the past 15 years or so. As it has evolved toward becoming a
net outward investor, China has apparently understood—and hence sought—the
benefits of investment treaty protections in its BIT program. China balanced its BIT
program, however, by adopting the modern cannons of investment treaty protections
along the way (e.g., reference to customary international law in its FET and FPS
clauses), presumably to delimitate protection of its inbound FDI and perhaps to
align with Western nations’ model BITs (which in turn should foster confidence in
China’s protection of inbound FDI). Yet, despite the fact that protections under
China BITs have existed for more than three decades, the mechanism through which
such protections are ensured and enforced—i.e., investor-state arbitration—has only
recently started being triggered in disputes commenced by Chinese investors, as will
be seen below. Given the number of first generation BITs, which, as we have seen,
allow for limited access to investor-state arbitration, most such disputes involve ques-
tions of jurisdiction that respondent-states have raised and arbitral tribunals have
examined.
B. China’s consent to arbitral determination as scrutinized
by arbitral tribunals
Thus far, only seven cases were reported to have been brought pursuant to a
Chinese BIT: five by Chinese investors against foreign states,212 and two by a foreign
investor against China.213 As mentioned above, investment arbitration under a
Chinese BIT very much depends upon the generation of which the BIT is a part. For
example, although second and third-generation treaties do provide for investment ar-
bitration for ‘any dispute concerning an investment’ or disputes arising out of a viola-
tion of the treaty, respectively, first-generation BITs only allow those ‘involving the
amount of compensation for expropriation’. According to the dominant view, there-
fore, the only disputes that China agreed to arbitrate in its early BITs are solely dis-
putes over quantum due for expropriation. Other grounds for violation of a treaty
such as breach of FET, FPS, or the threshold issue of the existence of an expropri-
ation would thus need to be entertained by national courts of the host country.
Proponents of an expansionist stance on the scope of China’s consent to arbitration
have, however, gained some traction recently.
One example of this trend is the Tza Yap case Mr. Tza Yap filed a claim against
Peru, registered by ICSID on 12 February 2007, on the basis of the China–Peru BIT
dated 9 June 1994. This case involved an alleged expropriation by Peru of Mr. Tza
Yap’s fish flour company, TSG Peru S.A.C. Mr. Tza Yap claimed $25 million in
212 Sen˜or Tza Yap Shum v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6); Sanum Investments Limited and
The Government of the Lao Democratic People’s Republic (PCA Case No. 2013-13); China Heilongjiang
International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., Beijing Shougang Mining Investment Company Ltd.,
Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong International Industrial Co. Ltd. v Mongolia (PCA Case No. 2010-20); Ping An
Life Insurance Company of China, Ltd and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd v Kingdom
of Belgium (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29); Beijing Urban Construction Group Co Ltd v Republic of Yemen
(ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30).
213 Ekran Berhad (Malaysia) v People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15 (filed on 24 May
2011, the case was suspended on July 22 of the same year to finally be discontinued, upon joint request,
on 16 May 2013); Ansung Housing Co, Ltd v People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25.
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compensation. As the then prevailing China–Peru BIT was a first-generation treaty,
its dispute resolution clause provided for arbitration of only disputes involving the
amount of compensation due for expropriation.214
Mr. Tza Yap argued that the language of the BIT did not limit arbitration to the
question of the determination of the quantum for expropriation, but the necessary
pre-determination of the existence of an expropriation. In its decision on jurisdiction,
the Tribunal agreed with him:
Al otro lado del espectro interpretativo, la frase podrı´a incluir, adema´s del
monto de la compensacio´n, una determinacio´n de otras cuestiones impor-
tantes relativas a la alegada expropiacio´n. E´sta es la interpretacio´n solicitada
por el Demandante. Por diversas razones, el Tribunal decide que la u´ltima
interpretacio´n, la ma´s amplia, resulta ser la ma´s apropiada.215
The Tribunal based its decision on the fact that the word ‘involving’ is not re-
strictive as would the words ‘limited to’ or ‘exclusively’216 and that the context of
Article 8(3) supports such an interpretation.217 Peru filed a request for annulment of
the award and a hearing was held in March 2014 by an ICSID ad hoc committee, the
decision of which is pending.
Another example of the recent expansionist trend regarding the scope of China’s
consent to investor-state arbitration is the Sanum v. Laos arbitration. In this case, a
Macao investment firm alleged that it was expropriated from its investment in a hotel
and casino project under gambling licenses in Laos, requesting over US$235 million
in damages.218 Just as in Tza Yap, the arbitration provisions of the 1993 China–Laos
BIT provides that only ‘disputes involving the amount of compensation for expropri-
ation’ can be submitted to arbitration for resolution. The case has been discontinued
further to a settlement agreement dated 15 June 15 2014. Before the case was dis-
continued, however, the Sanum tribunal had an opportunity to rule on Laos’s juris-
dictional objections based on the restrictive language of the China–Laos BIT.219
The tribunal adopted the Tza Yap approach and held that the language of Article
8(3) does allow arbitration of disputes ‘involving the amount of compensation’. The
tribunal based its decision on the fact that the word ‘involving’ is not limitative in
and of itself. Also importantly, and in the same vein as Tza Yap’s reasoning, the tribu-
nal rejected Laos’s argument that Article 8(3) was intended to only submit questions
214 Turner and Mangan, above n 117, at 44–45 ‘the recent claim under this very BIT filed by a Chinese in-
vestor [Tza Yap Shum] against Peru could, on the express terms of the BIT as set out above, only be in
relation to the compensation that is due as a result of an expropriation that has been determined by a
national court to have taken place’.
215 Sen˜or Tza Yap Shum v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6) Decision on Jurisdiction and
Competence (2009), para 150.
216 ibid., at para 151.
217 ibid., at paras 152ff.
218 See Sanum Investments Limited and The Government of the Lao Democratic People’s Republic, Notice of
Arbitration, available at http://rlge.org/DOC/Sanum%20Investments%20-%2002%20-%20NoA.pdf
(last visited 11 September 2014).
219 The Award on Jurisdiction can be downloaded through Investment Arbitration Reporter’s website, avail-
able at http://www.iareporter.com/downloads/20140721.
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of quantum for expropriation to arbitration, the prior question of liability for expro-
priation being left for the host state’s courts to decide. This is because Article 8 con-
tains a so-called ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause according to which arbitration is not
available in the event the claiming party has resorted to local courts. In particular,
the tribunal stated that a party would be precluded from ever bringing a claim for de-
termination of the amount of compensation to arbitration because such party would
be compelled to resort to local courts for claims over the existence of an expropri-
ation, which would also settle the question of the amount thereof, thereby rendering
the arbitration mechanism inoperative.220
Because of the possible import of the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction for future
disputes, Laos has sought a set aside decision from the courts of Singapore (where
the arbitration was held), notwithstanding the settlement agreement.221 The
Singapore High Court went on to annul the Sanum award on jurisdiction by judg-
ment dated 20 January 2015, and notably stated in dictum that ‘the Tribunal did not
possess subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s expropriation claims because
only disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation can be submitted
to arbitration under Art 8(3)’.222
The expansionist analysis of China’s consent to arbitration in its early IIAs has
been criticized,223 and indeed, certain elements seem to militate against the adequacy
of the Tza Yap and Sanum tribunals’ rulings.
First, a treaty must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and pur-
pose’.224 China BITs of the first generation specifically referred to ‘disputes involving
the amount of compensation for expropriation’ as the only disputes between in-
vestors and states that could be arbitrated, the other disputes being subject to litiga-
tion before national courts. Such language appears, on its face, to be restrictive: if
China had agreed to arbitrate all matters of expropriation, it was arguably sophisti-
cated enough as a sovereign to have stated so expressly.
Second, China’s intent not to submit to international tribunals’ jurisdiction in the
early years of its BIT program was expressly recognized, but disregarded, by the Tza
220 It is worth noting that the rationale in the Tza Yap and Sanum cases hinges on a fork-in-the-road provi-
sion. In both cases, the mechanism for resorting to international arbitration as provided in the relevant
treaty consists of prior negotiations in the context of a pronouncement of expropriation pursuant to the
expropriation section of the BIT. It thus seems that the contemplated mechanism for international arbi-
tration is distinct from the national court action that the respective tribunal envisioned. When an expro-
priation is proclaimed, Art. 8(3) allows arbitration over the amount of compensation if prior
negotiations proved unfruitful as to the ‘equivalen[ce of the compensation] to the value of the expropri-
ated investment’ per Art. 4(2). When expropriation is not proclaimed—and its very existence is thus dis-
puted—the mechanism that China consented to is contained in Art. 8(2), that is resorting to national
courts after failed negotiations.
221 See Luke Eric Peterson, China offers support to Laos, in latter’s bid to set aside arbitrators’ expansive
reading of China-Laos BIT, Investment Arbitration Reporter (21 July 2014).
222 Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments Ltd, Judgment (2015) SGHC
15, para 128.
223 Wei Shen, ‘The Good, the Bad or the Ugly? A Critique of the Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence
in Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru’, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law, paras 31ff., available
at http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/55.short.
224 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Art. 31 (1).
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Yap and Sanum tribunals. In that respect, in its decision to annul the Sanum award,
the Singapore High Court noted the Tza Yap tribunal’s observation that ‘communist
regimes possessed a certain degree of distrust regarding investment of private capital
and were concerned about the decisions of international tribunals on matters over
which they have no control’.225 China indeed reiterated that it did not intend to con-
sent to arbitration other than to ‘disputes over compensation resulting from expro-
priation’ when it acceded to the ICSID system in 1993 and issued its notification
under Article 25(4) of the Washington Convention.226 As regards Tza Yap, which
was an ICSID case, it should be noted that the context for the interpretation of a
treaty can be extracted from ‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty’.227 Given that Article 8(3) of the
China–Peru BIT submitted expropriation amount disputes to ICSID, China’s above
notification appears relevant to establish competence ratione voluntatis—or lack
thereof—with respect to cases arising under first-generation BITs such as Tza Yap’s.
As of the date of this article, China has not made any comment disavowing this offi-
cial position.
Third, the argument that the fork-in-the-road provision would preclude access to
investor-state arbitration seems erroneous. Indeed, the BITs under which the Tza
Yap and Sanum cases arose had an express provision contemplating that compensa-
tion was due for ‘proclaimed’ expropriations, which provision is context for, and
should be read in conjunction with, the dispute resolution clause. In the light of
China’s stance on submission to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, it seems
clear that the intent of China was to reserve for arbitration only the question of de-
termination of quantum where the state had sovereignly declared an expropriation/
nationalization by way of an executive order or regulation. Following that logic, a
party could resort to arbitration in case of disagreement over the civil—as opposed
to sovereign—question as to whether the ‘amount of compensation for expropri-
ation’ offered is adequate, given that international standards may be more favorable
than those of the host state.
Fourth, there is a line of precedents under BITs from other countries containing
similar language than that of Chinese BITs (albeit perhaps more explicitly restrictive)
that is at odds with the tribunal’s ruling in Tza Yap. For example, the tribunal in the
Berschader case held that, under the Belgium–Russia BIT, ‘the ordinary meaning of
the provision [which read “any dispute . . . relating to the amount or mode of com-
pensation” for expropriation] excludes from the scope of the arbitration
clause . . . disputes concerning whether or not an act of expropriation actually
occurred’.228 In the RosInvest case, ‘the Tribunal [could not] see how the reference
in the first jurisdictional clause expressly to the amount or payment of compensation
under Articles 4 or 5 [of the UK-Russia BIT] only can nevertheless be interpreted as
a reference also to the earlier sections of Article 5 which deal with expropriation in
225 Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Sanum Investments Ltd, Judgment (2015) SGHC
15, para 123.
226 See above Section IIIA.
227 VCLT, Art. 31(2)(b).
228 Vladimir Berschader and Moı¨se Berschader v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award
dated 21 April 2006, para 153.
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general’.229 More recently, the ST-AD tribunal decided that, under the Germany–
Bulgaria BIT, ‘the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to one narrow issue only, that is,
the amount of compensation for an investment found to be expropriated by a finding
made by a Bulgarian court’.230 We should note, however, that at least one other pre-
cedent lends support to the findings of the Tza Yap and Sanum tribunals. In the
Renta4 case, the tribunal indeed held that it had ‘jurisdiction to decide whether com-
pensation is “due” to them under international law by reason of the conduct of which
they complain (and if so in which amount)’.231
Another interesting and ancillary jurisdictional question raised in the Sanum case
is whether the ‘narrow door’232 left open by first-generation China BITs could be cir-
cumvented through the MFN clause that most of China’s early BITs contain.
Indeed, it is reported that Sanum had attempted to bypass the narrow arbitration
clause of the China–Laos BIT through its MFN mechanism. That way, Sanum was
hoping to benefit from other Lao BITs granting access to international arbitration
for disputes beyond issues of quantum, as an alternative argument. Sanum’s rationale
was that the ‘activities associated with investments’, referred to in the China–Laos
BIT’s MFN clause, would ‘include access to arbitration over both claims of both ex-
propriation and violation of fair and equitable treatment’.233 Indeed, some tribunals
have held that all the provisions, including dispute resolution clauses, were subject to
the MFN clause’s reach.234 Yet, the MFN clause is almost invariably textually linked
to other provisions regarding the substantive treatment to be given to foreign invest-
ment, such as the FET. Consequently, some commentators have posited that the
drafters of the BITs intended to reserve MFN benefits to substantive protections
only.235 This understanding was reached by some arbitral tribunals, such as in the
229 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. Arb. V079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction
dated October 2007, paras 112–114.
230 ST-AD GmbH (Germany) v The Republic of Bulgaria, PCA Case No. 2011-06 (ST-BG), Award on
Jurisdiction dated 18 July 2013, paras 368–374.
231 See, e.g., Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections
dated 20 March 2009, paras 19ff. In another case, the tribunal also held that it had jurisdiction to decide
whether an expropriation had actually occurred. This case is, however, clearly distinguishable from Tza
Yap and Sanum in that the language of the dispute resolution clause provided that disputes ‘concerning
compensation’ were arbitrable, and not disputes ‘involving the amount of compensation’. See European
Media Ventures SA v Czech Republic, High Court, Queen’s Bench, Judgment dated 5 December 2007,
2007 EWHC 2851 (Comm).
232 ST-AD v Bulgaria, above n 224, at para 372.
233 See Jarrod Hepburn and Luke Eric Peterson, Laos has yet to pay $56 million arbitral debt but new in-
vestors line up to sue; Chinese claimant says MFN clause circumvents narrow arbitration clause,
Investment Arbitration Reporter (19 August 2012), available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/
20120819_2.
234 See, e.g., Emilio Augustı`n Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction dated 25 January 2000, para 64; Austrian Airlines v Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Final
Award dated 20 October, 2009, para 124.
235 See Campbell McLachlan QC, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment
Arbitration: Substantive Principles, para 7.168 (Oxford University Press, 2007) (‘it is particularly import-
ant to construe the ambit of the State’s consent strictly . . . the balance struck in investment treaties be-
tween the various dispute settlement options is often the subject of careful negotiation between the
State Parties, selecting from a range of different techniques. It is not to be presumed that this can be dis-
rupted by an investor selecting at will from an assorted menu of other options provided in other treaties,
negotiated with other State Parties and in other circumstances . . . . The result, will be that the Most
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Plama v. Bulgaria case where the arbitration clause at hand contained similar lan-
guage to that of first-generation Chinese BITs.236 Confirming the understanding of
the Plama tribunal, China’s recent treaties expressly state that the MFN clause does
not apply to dispute resolution.237 The tribunal in the Sanum case eventually denied
Sanum’s argument because ‘to read into [the MFN] clause a dispute settlement pro-
vision to cover all protections under the Treaty when the Treaty itself provides for
very limited access to international arbitration would result in a substantial re-write
of the Treaty and an extension of the States Parties’ consent to arbitration beyond
what may be assumed to have been their intention’.238
Finally, with respect to arbitrations involving China IIAs, it should be observed
that there are two other known cases involving a China BIT of first generation cur-
rently underway In the China Heilongjiang et al. v. Mongolia arbitration,239 Chinese
SOE investors have alleged that the ad hoc tribunal was competent to decide
whether an expropriation by Mongolia occurred further to the revocation of their li-
cense to exploit the Tumurtei iron ore deposit, despite the narrow consent provided
in Article 8(3) of the China–Mongolia BIT..In the recently filed Beijing Urban
Construction Group Co Ltd v. Republic of Yemen ICSID case, it is to be expected that,
Favoured Nation clause will not apply to investment treaties’ dispute settlement provisions, save where
the States expressly so provide’.). See also Zachary Douglas, ‘The MFN Clause in Investment
Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails’, 2(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement
97(2011) (arguing that MFN clauses do not apply to dispute settlement mechanism as ‘[t]here is a fun-
damental distinction in general international law between the substantive obligations in a treaty, which
are addressed to the state parties, and the provisions that create a jurisdictional mandate for an interna-
tional tribunal, which are addressed to the tribunal and to the disputing parties, who enter into a rela-
tionship of procedural equality once arbitration proceedings have been commenced. This distinction
must be respected by investment treaty tribunals in confronting the question of the scope of MFN
clauses.’). But see Stephan W. Schill, ‘Allocating Adjudicatory Authority: Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses
as a Basis of Jurisdiction-A Reply to Zachary Douglas’, 2(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement
353 (2011) (arguing that the application of MFN standard to dispute settlement mechanism ‘accords
with the structure of international law and the most fundamental duty it imposes on States, namely to
comply with its international obligations’.).
236 Plama Consortium Ltd v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 8
February 2005, para 223: ‘an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the
basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them’. See also
Berschader v Russia, above n 222, at para 206 (‘The starting point in determining whether or not an
MFN clause encompasses the dispute resolution provisions of other treaties must always be an assess-
ment of the intention of the contracting parties upon the conclusion of the original treaty. The Tribunal
has applied the principle that an MFN provision in a BIT will only incorporate by reference an arbitra-
tion clause from another BIT where the terms of the original BIT clearly and unambiguously so provide
or where it can otherwise be clearly inferred that this was the intention of the Contracting Parties’);
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award dated 8
December 2008, paras 173ff.
237 See, e.g., China–New Zealand FTA, Art. 139 (2) (‘For greater certainty, the [MFN] obligation in this
Article does not encompass a requirement to extend to investors of the other Party dispute resolution
procedures other than those set out in this Chapter.’)
238 Sanum v Laos, Jurisdictional Award, above n 214, at para 358. As seen above, the Sanum tribunal
decided that the dispute resolution clause itself encompassed issues of determination of expropriation,
making the question of expansion through MFN clause unnecessary.
239 China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., Beijing Shougang Mining
Investment Company Ltd., Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong International Industrial Co. Ltd. v Mongolia, PCA Case
No. 2010-20. Mr. Nolan represents Mongolia in this arbitration.
38  China’s Outward FDI and International Investment Law








because of the restrictive language in the China–Yemen BIT providing for arbitration
of only disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation,240 the Chinese
investor also will argue that the tribunal has jurisdiction over its claims related to its
building of an international airport in Sana’a for an amount of US$114 million.241
C. The apparent reluctance to resort to investor-state arbitration
under Chinese IIAs
Despite the gradual broadening of China’s consent to arbitration that its IIAs have
reflected as China outward flow of investment has increased, few disputes arising
under China’s IIAs have been reported.242 The relative scarcity of cases involving
China BITs is somewhat surprising, considering the number of treaties it concluded
since the early 1980s and its volumes of inward as well as outward investment regis-
tered over the past 15 years.
Some authors advance that the reasons are cultural: ‘praise of harmony usually
comes first’ which makes it preferable for Chinese people not to resort to litigious
means of resolution of disputes.243 Another commentator put it that, in a society
dominated by the Confucianist ideology, conflicts are frowned upon for they ‘ob-
struct[] the natural order of life and other intrinsic disharmonious principles’.244 As a
result, mediation or other informal means of resolution of disputes (e.g., direct nego-
tiation with government officials through Chinese partners) is said to have contrib-
uted to the paucity of investment arbitration cases.245
The reasons may, in fact, be more pragmatic. With respect to inbound invest-
ment, foreign investors may be discouraged from risking time, money and efforts in
a case where they expect that, irrespective of the outcome, the chances of enforcing
the award in China may be slim. Indeed, China’s legal landscape has been said cur-
rently to disallow enforcement of foreign investor-state arbitral awards. First, China
has, upon acceding to the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, expressly excluded enforceability of investor-state
awards.246 Second, the principle that ICSID awards are self-executing in a state’s legal
order may be undermined by the requirement that execution be ‘governed by the
240 See Chester Brown (ed.), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press,
2013), 173.
241 See ‘Chinese investor takes on Yemen at ICSID’, Global Arbitration Review, 9 December 2014, available
at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33242/chinese-investor-takes-yemen-icsid/
242 See Wang, above n 170, at 7ff. We note, however, that six out of the seven investor-state cases reported
have been commenced in the last 5 years, which may signal a decreasing frilosity as regards investor-state
arbitration under China IIAs.
243 Ibid., at 19.
244 George O. White, ‘Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute Resolution in
the People’s Republic of China’, 55 Tennessee Journal of Business Law 64 (2003).
245 Wang, above n 170, at 20–21. Wang emphasizes on the importance for government officials at every
level to not deter foreign investment: ‘Where the attraction of foreign investment is essential for both
GDP and the positive performance evaluations of local governments, any dispute with foreign investors
would be seen to be counterproductive to this effort, as it may be viewed as creating a poor environment
for foreign investment. Whenever a serious dispute arises which triggers withdrawal of foreign invest-
ments, the local government officials in charge may be held responsible.’
246 Notice on the Implementation of China’s Accession to the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1987, issued under Art. 5(2) of the New York Convention.
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laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories
such execution is sought’.247 Importantly, China does not have any law allowing en-
forcement of arbitral awards against state-owned property.248
What is more, China adopts a rigid position on sovereignty. China emphatically
stated that it strictly adheres to the principle of absolute sovereign immunity. Indeed,
in the FG Hemisphere case,249 China propounded that ‘[t]he consistent and prin-
cipled position of China is that a state and its property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy
absolute immunity, including absolute immunity from jurisdiction and from execu-
tion, and has never applied the so-called principle or theory of “restrictive immun-
ity”.’250 This arguably contributes to investor sentiment that resorting to arbitration
against China would prove inefficacious due to the enforcement challenges associ-
ated with arbitral award against the state.
The reasons seem similarly rooted with respect to outbound investment. On the
one hand, the influence of China in Asia, where much of its outward FDI goes,251
possibly contributes to prompt settlement between host countries and potential
claimants Chinese SOEs outside of litigious avenues. On the other hand, the massive
underwriting by the China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (‘Sinosure’) of
export credit insurance to extend credit enhancement to Chinese investors,252 mostly
SOEs as explained above, makes resorting to legal protections little appealing. It is
worthy of note that Sinosure was established and became operational in 2001, that is
when China announced its ‘going abroad’ strategy to the world and concomitant in-
sertion of broad arbitration clause in its IIAs.253 Coincidentally, the second gener-
ation of BITs started including subrogation clauses whereby if a state agency—such
as Sinosure—makes a payment to a Chinese investor in relation to investments in
Therefore, awards rendered under the auspices of other arbitral institutions than ICSID, such as ICC or
SCC, or by ad hoc tribunals cannot either be enforced in China.
247 Washington (ICSID) Convention, Art. 54(3).
248 Wang, above n 170, at 24–25.
249 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ors, Judgment, [FACV Nos. 5, 6
& 7 of 2010].
250 China’s Letter of 25 August 2010, reproduced at para 211 of the Judgment. China goes on to say
The courts in China have no jurisdiction over, nor in practice have they ever entertained, any
case in which a foreign state or government is sued as a defendant or any claim involving the
property of any foreign state or government, irrespective of the nature or purpose of the relevant
act of the foreign state or government and also irrespective of the nature, purpose or use of the
relevant property of the foreign state or government. At the same time, China has never ac-
cepted any foreign courts having jurisdiction over cases in which the State or Government of
China is sued as a defendant, or over cases involving the property of the State or Government
of China. This principled position held by the Government of China is unequivocal and
consistent.
251 Sophie Song, Southeast Asia receives more foreign direct investment (FDI) than China, which is now the
world’s third-largest foreign investor, International Business Times (5 March 2014), available at http://
www.ibtimes.com/southeast-asia-receives-more-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-china-which-now-worlds-
third-largest.
252 As of late 2013, Sinosure had ‘supported export, domestic trade and investment with a total value of
USD 1484.65 billion’ and had ‘facilitated the lending of CNY 1.8 trillion by 190 banks’ (about USD 290
billion). See Sinosure’s Company Profile, available at http://www.sinosure.com.cn/sinosure/english/
Company%20Profile.html.
253 See Sinosure’s History, available at http://www.sinosure.com.cn/sinosure/english/history.htm.
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the territory of a contracting country, such agency will be subrogated in the rights of
the investor and will thus be in a position to trigger the protections of the treaty
itself.254
Consistent with China’s new status as a net outward investor,255 it may fully em-
brace the investor-state arbitration system moving forward. It has signalled of late
that it may do so, through the above-described evolution of its investment protection
treaties.
IV . QUO VADIS?
As laid out above, China’s transition to become a major contributor of outward FDI
has led to a profound reformation of its investment treaty regime. The data amply es-
tablish the extent to which China has departed from being a purely capital-importing
country, in an effort to sustain its rapid economic growth, to a capital-exporting
country, catching up with Europe and the USA.256 At the same time, a closer analysis
of the data reveals that the picture is in some respect more complicated than what is
commonly presented.257 As a general comment, the size of China’s outward FDI
stock was merely US$ 730 billion in 2014, significantly smaller than that of the USA,
with over US$ 5 trillion. Also, although much has been made of China’s takeover of
Africa in that it ‘is trying to establish firm control to resources-rich countries’,258
China comes in only in third place among developing country investors, behind
Malaysia and South Africa259 and is furthermore in the view of one commentator de
facto limited to financing infrastructures in ‘remote locations often with poor
quality’.260
By juxtaposing the economical raw data with the actual practice of China vis-a`-vis
the international legal regime respecting investment treaty, one cannot help but no-
tice the correlation between the language adopted in its IIAs and the clear movement
from its positioning on the investment spectrum. Although China had an active BIT
program since the early 1980s, it was of an extremely limited applicability. Without
China’s consent to arbitration of investor-state disputes, BITs were ‘toothless’.
Under the second generation of IIAs which began in 1998, investors finally dis-
posed of a dispute resolution mechanism to ensure that the promised treaty protec-
tions were upheld. As explained above, however, it remains to be seen whether such
investors could recoup any potential losses incurred as a result of a treaty violation as
(i) no investor ventured in the uncharted territory of investment treaty arbitration
against China yet, and (ii) even if an arbitration had been carried out under a China
IIA, China’s position on the unenforceability of non-ICSID investor-state arbitral
254 See, e.g., China–Barbados BIT, Art. 7. For an example of subrogation clause in third-generation IIA, see
China–Japan–Republic of Korea TIT, Art. 14.
255 See above Section A.
256 ibid.
257 ibid.
258 Huiping Chen, Sino-African BITs practice: a new legal paradigm? Paper at 3, Taipei Conference on
International and Comparative Law (forthcoming).
259 See UNCTAD, above n 11, at 40.
260 Chen, above n 254, at 4.
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awards and its lack of domestic legal mechanisms allowing enforcement of awards
against state assets could deflated even the boldest investor.
In its third generation of IIAs, China comes of age with respect to adherence to
the international legal regime for investment protection and solidifies its economic
prominence in the likes of the USA and European countries. China sees itself as a
provider of outbound flows of investment and as a participant in the international
legal regime. Accordingly, it seems to align its view as to the fundamental tenets of
investor-state protection and adopts the hallmarks of European Union or USA IIAs.
Notably, and in keeping with the USA practice observed under the 2004 US Model
BIT, China has largely accepted ICSID arbitration of disputes against investors
(including under ICSID’s Additional Facility),261 abandoned umbrella clauses, sub-
jected FET and FPS protections to customary norms of international law and even
operated a paradigm shift by agreeing to the concept of a pre-establishment NT on
the basis of a negative list.262 It also ensured along the way that its SOEs, through
which most of its foreign resources-oriented investments are channelled, are ex-
pressly covered by the investment protections that are owed to ‘investors’ as defined
in these IIAs of third generation.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the position of China in its interaction
with other mature home countries will result in a further adoption of recent invest-
ment protection standards and its engaging in a fifth generation of IIAs. For example,
the 2012 US Model BIT anticipates resorting to a future multilateral appellate mech-
anism,263 provides for transparency of arbitral proceedings,264 recognizes the obliga-
tions of states under domestic labor laws,265 and establishes that environmental
concerns may justify non-precluded measures.266 In the light of global efforts toward
encouraging ‘sustainable’ foreign direct investment, spearheaded by the OECD267
and UNCTAD,268 it is possible that China will jump on the bandwagon and follow
along the lead of other capital-exporting nations. There is some indication that
China may decide to do so upon review of some recent treaties in which, for ex-
ample, environmental measures do enjoy a basic level of observance.269 If this is the
future trajectory of China’s IIAs, then there is hope for a largely uniform interna-
tional investment law and policy regime.
261 See, e.g., Art. 15 of the China–Japan–Republic of Korea TIT.





267 See OECD, OECD 2011 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
268 See ‘Investment policy framework for sustainable development’, in UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012).
269 See, e.g., China–Japan–Republic of Korea Treaty, Art. 23 (‘each Contracting Party should not waive or
otherwise derogate from such environmental measures as an encouragement for the establishment, ac-
quisition or expansion of investments in its territory.’).
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